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Abstract
Saving and wealth are important determinants for the wellbeing of individual
households and the development of whole economies. Unlike flow variables
like income and consumption, however, balance sheet data on wealth have
been collected only recently. Among the developing countries, South Africa
has been the first to publish official household sector balance sheets, one of
the first to conduct large-scale household wealth surveys, and one of the first
to give researchers access to anonymised tax records. In this dissertation, I
use these new data to study saving and wealth in the context of a developing
country with extreme inequality.
The first chapter focuses on saving and studies how the balance sheet
concept of saving (the change in wealth between two periods of time) differs
from the flow concept (the residual between income and expenditure). It
finds that household wealth has grown much more strongly over the last
decades than would have been implied by the flow measure of saving alone,
owing to sizeable capital gains on existing asset holdings. The second chapter
puts this finding into an international perspective, tying it to the literature
that developed from Thomas Piketty’s influential Capital in the Twenty-
First Century (2014). While Piketty finds that capital gains contributed to
a strong increase in rich-world wealth-income ratios between 1970 and 2010, I
find that a similar trend started only in the late 1990s in South Africa. I also
find that this trend was generated almost entirely through corporate savings
and the strong performance of the stock market, which contrasts with the
importance of household savings and house price developments in Piketty’s
sample of advanced economies.
Since a large share of stocks are held through domestic pension and
retirement funds, the appreciation of financial assets has benefited millions
of South Africans. Yet, it is very likely that the boom has enriched a small
iii
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number of individual shareholders disproportionately. The third chapter thus
takes a distributional perspective on wealth, using two distinct data sources
to estimate the degree of inequality in the country. I compare a survey
with 18,820 respondents in 6,450 households to a novel dataset of almost 1.2
million personal income tax records. Despite the differences in the coverage
of each source, I find robust evidence that wealth is much more unequally
distributed than income. Ten percent of the population own more than 50–
95 percent of all wealth, compared to a top labour income share of “only”
45 percent. While an income or consumption perspective thus allows us to
speak of a South African middle class, the balance sheet data suggest that a
propertied middle class is still largely non-existent.
Keywords: Saving; wealth; asset accumulation; income and wealth
distribution; inequality; data and measurement; South Africa
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Opsomming
Besparing en rykdom is belangrike bepalers van die welstand van
individuele huishoudings sowel as die ontwikkeling van ekonomiee¨ in die
geheel. Tog, in teenstelling met vloeiveranderlikes soos inkomste en
verbruik, word balansstaatdata oor rykdom eers sedert betreklik onlangs
ingesamel. Suid-Afrika was een van die eerste ontwikkelende lande wat
amptelike balansstate vir die huishoudelike sektor gepubliseer, grootskaalse
huishoudelike welvaartopnames gedoen, en navorsers toegang tot naamlose
belastingrekords gegee het.
In hierdie tesis gebruik ek hierdie nuwe data om besparing en rykdom in
die konteks van ’n ontwikkelende land met uiterste ongelykheid te bestudeer.
Die eerste hoofstuk konsentreer op besparing, en bestudeer die verskille
tussen die balansstaatkonsep van besparing (die verandering in rykdom van
een tydperk tot ’n volgende) en die vloeikonsep (die verskil tussen inkomste
en uitgawes). Dit bring aan die lig dat huishoudelike rykdom oor die afgelope
dekades veel sterker gegroei het as wat die vloeimaatstaf van besparing op sy
eie sou aandui, as gevolg van beduidende kapitaalwinste op bestaande bates.
Die tweede hoofstuk beskou hierdie bevinding uit ’n internasionale
hoek deur dit te koppel aan die literatuur wat uit Thomas Piketty se
gesaghebbende Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014) ontwikkel het.
Terwyl Piketty vasgestel het dat kapitaalwinste tussen 1970 en 2010 tot ’n
sterk toename in rykdom-inkomsteverhoudings in die welvarende wreld gelei
het, bevind ek dat ’n soortgelyke tendens eers laat in die 1990’s in Suid-
Afrika posgevat het. Ek bevind ook dat hierdie tendens byna geheel en al
deur korporatiewe besparing en die sterk prestasie van die aandelemark tot
stand gekom het, in teenstelling met die belang van huishoudelike besparing
en huisprysontwikkelings in Piketty se steekproef van gevorderde ekonomiee¨.
v
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Aangesien binnelandse pensioen- en aftreefondse oor ’n groot
aandeelhouding beskik, het miljoene Suid-Afrikaners baat gevind by die
waardevermeerdering van finansie¨le bates. Tog het di voorspoedgolf heel
waarskynlik ’n klein getal individuele aandeelhouers buite verhouding verryk.
Die derde hoofstuk beskou rykdom dus uit ’n verdelingsoogpunt deur van
twee verskillende databronne gebruik te maak om die mate van ongelykheid in
die land te bepaal. Ek vergelyk ’n opname van ongeveer 18 820 respondente in
6 450 huishoudings met ’n nuwe datastel van bykans 1,2 miljoen persoonlike
inkomstebelastingrekords. Hoewel die omvang en dekking van die databronne
verskil, kom ek af op robuuste bewyse dat rykdom ongelyker verdeel is as
inkomste. Tien persent van die bevolking besit meer as 90-95 persent van
alle rykdom, vergeleke met ’n topinkomste-aandeel van “slegs” 45 persent.
Hoewel ’n mens dus volgens ’n inkomste- of verbruiksperspektief van ’n
Suid-Afrikaanse middelklas kan praat, dui die balansstaatdata daarop dat
’n middelklas van eiendomsbesitters steeds grotendeels ontbreek.
vi
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Introduction
When I started to investigate potential research topics at the beginning
of 2015, the issue of household saving caught my attention. I had just
moved to South Africa from central Europe, where economists were growing
increasingly worried about the high savings rates of the household sector.
Even after central banks had lowered interest rates to near zero, household
spending remained insufficient to support the recovery after the financial
crisis, and concerns about a secular stagnation became more prominent (see,
e.g. Baldwin and Teulings, 2014).
In South Africa, the tables are turned: concerns about saving exist for
the opposite reason. Household savings rates had just reached historic lows
of close to zero, raising fears that citizens would be vulnerable to unexpected
losses or expenses and would struggle to maintain their living standards
during retirement. The low propensity to save was also thought to increase
South Africa’s reliance on foreign capital inflows, increasing the vulnerability
of the economy to large current account deficits and skewing the market
structure in favour of larger companies (National Planning Commission,
2012). Savings-enhancing policy initiatives such as the introduction of tax-
free saving and investment accounts in March 2015 were motivated largely
by these concerns.
Given the prominence of the savings debate in South Africa and abroad,
it surprised me how little attention was being paid to the specific measure of
saving under consideration. Saving is by no means an unequivocally defined
concept, and has been subject to vivid academic discussions since the work
of Henry Simons (1938), John Hicks (1939), Raymond Goldsmith (1955)
and Milton Friedman (1957). The most important distinction made in this
literature has been that between the stock and the flow concept of saving:
The former views saving as the accumulation of wealth between the beginning
1
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INTRODUCTION
and end of a period of time and is often considered the theoretically “pure”
concept; the latter views saving as the proportion of income that is not spent
on consumption within that same period and has come to dominate the
empirical work in post-war, pre-crisis macroeconomics.
The two concepts of saving are closely related, of course: In accordance
with the logic of double-entry bookkeeping, savings “supplied” through
restraint on consumption must be “used” to build up one’s assets or pay one’s
debts. Given that capital gains on existing assets are generally not counted as
income, however, the two corresponding empirical measures can still deviate
from each other. Such discrepancies are particularly pronounced during
prolonged asset price booms, when the flow measure will understate saving
and wealth formation relative to the stock perspective (Peach and Steindel,
2000, Perozek and Reinsdorf, 2002).
The discrepancies between stocks and flows are, implicitly, also at the
heart of Thomas Piketty’s influential work on wealth and income. In Capital
in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty (2014) shows how prolonged asset price
gains in rich countries caused a disproportionate growth in private wealth,
from 200–300 percent of national income in 1970 to 400–700 percent in
2010. The observed divergence between wealth and income highlights the
importance of considering balance sheet variables in macroeconomic analyses
(see also Piketty and Zucman, 2014, 2015).
The fact that flow variables nevertheless remain the dominant source of
information on macroeconomic developments is primarily due to the scarcity
of reliable stock data for empirical analyses. Whereas flow data have been
recorded in the national accounts since the 1940s, stock variables are only
gradually being included in official statistics. And even where balance sheet
data have been collected, they are not yet commonly used by economists
in research and government. Even in South Africa, for instance, recent
proposals for higher wealth taxation made more references to Piketty’s
findings on the major advanced economies than to an analysis of domestic
data (Davis Tax Committee, 2015). This is despite the fact that South
Africa was the first developing country to compile its own household sector
2
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INTRODUCTION
balance sheets in 2006, and also despite the fact that Piketty’s concern about
the growing importance of wealth contrasts at least outwardly with South
Africa’s original concerns about low saving and scarce capital – the concerns
that motivated this dissertation in the first place. By analysing South Africa’s
balance sheet data, I attempt to weigh these two perspectives against each
other and study how the dynamics of saving and wealth formation differ in
a country that is characterised by a lower level of development and much
higher levels of inequality than the advanced economies, for which Piketty
had found that capital had made a comeback.
In the first chapter of this dissertation I explore the topic of saving.
Drawing on a large body of literature, I synthesise the main considerations
in selecting appropriate measures of saving and apply them to the context
of the South African household sector. These analyses confirm that the
balance sheet perspective yields a significantly higher and historically much
more stable savings rate than the conventional flow concept would imply,
owing to a steady increase in the value of existing assets in household
portfolios. In the second chapter, I put these findings into an international
perspective, replicating Piketty’s analyses on wealth-income ratios for South
Africa. While Chapter 1 shows that households have (on aggregate) become
much wealthier than their saving behaviour would have predicted, Chapter 2
shows that this discrepancy was nevertheless much less pronounced than in
the advanced economies. Using Piketty and Zucman’s (2014) decomposition
methodology, I also investigate which factors contributed to this gap.
Although both chapters take a macroeconomic perspective on saving
and wealth, they also raise important distributional questions. Wealth is
always more concentrated than incomes, such that any asset revaluations
(which explain the difference between the stock and flow measure of saving
in Chapter 1 and contribute to the divergence between wealth and incomes
in Chapter 2) are likely to benefit a relatively small share of wealthy
households disproportionately. Indeed, one reason for the concern about
wealth-income ratios is its potential distributional implications. If wealth
gains importance over incomes, wealth inequality is likely to play an
3
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increasing role in shaping overall inequality (Piketty and Zucman, 2014,
2015). To investigate the consequences of the macroeconomic factors on
the microeconomic distribution, I focus the third chapter of this dissertation
on the distribution of wealth relative to the distribution of incomes.
As with macroeconomic statistics, microeconomic surveys have until
recently been limited to measuring flow variables. Even South Africa’s
relatively large literature on inequality has historically focused on income and
consumption only (see, e.g., Alvaredo and Atkinson, 2010, Leibbrandt et al.,
2010, Van der Berg, 2010). The second wave of the biannual National
Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), conducted in 2010–2011, was the first large-
scale household survey to contain a module on wealth. Compared to the
income and consumption modules, however, these data were given much less
attention – the analyses of Daniels et al. (2014) being the only exception to
date.
Wealth surveys indeed suffer from more limitations than income or
consumption surveys. A sensitive and complex subject, wealth is often
understated considerably in voluntary surveys. Since richer households
are generally least likely to reveal their wealth, this understatement
is particularly pronounced in the top of the distribution (ECB2013a;
Vermeulen, 2014). Seeking more accurate data on top wealth, some
researchers have suggested using information from tax records on investment
incomes instead (see, e.g., Bricker et al., 2016, Saez and Zucman, 2014).
Following their lead, I re-evaluate the NIDS wealth data by comparing them
to a previously unpublished dataset of almost 1.2 million personal income
tax (PIT) records for the 2010–2011 tax year.1
To compare the information from both data sources, I need to make
several adjustments. The PIT provides no information on forms of wealth
1Researchers in other countries have estimated the underlying asset holdings
by capitalising incomes using average investment returns for each asset class
(Saez and Zucman, 2014, Wolff, 1987). Given the low granularity of the PIT records
(split into interest income and other investment income only) and given the additional
sensitivity that would be introduced by making assumptions on the returns of the other
financial assets category, I used investment incomes directly. This simplification equates
to the assumption that all asset classes generate the same average returns.
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that do not generate taxable investment incomes and does not capture
individuals with incomes below the filing thresholds – almost 80 percent
of the South African adult population. To match the survey population with
the tax filing population, I “scale” PIT by simulating the wealth of non-filers
from a bottom-censored lognormal distribution, and “resample” the NIDS by
dropping and re-drawing the richest one percent from a top-censored Pareto
distribution. I then combine the estimates using the PIT as a measure
of inequality for financial assets, the NIDS as a measure of inequality for
non-financial assets, and the portfolio distribution in the national accounts
to weigh the two. Despite the large differences in the data sources, this
procedure yields surprisingly robust and comparable results for the South
African wealth and income distribution, and shows that the former is indeed
much more unequally distributed than the latter.
Saving and wealth are important determinants for the wellbeing of
individual households and the development of whole economies. To assess the
level and distribution of these variables we need reliable macro- and micro-
level balance sheet data, the collection of which has only recently started. To
date, most of our knowledge on household sector balance sheets stems from
a small number of advanced economies, studied by Thomas Piketty, Gabriel
Zucman and Emmanuel Saez and other researchers in the World Wealth
and Income Database project (2016). South Africa is the first developing
country to include detailed sectoral balance sheets in its national accounts,
one of a few countries with a large-scale household wealth survey, and one of
only a handful that gives researchers access to anonymised records from tax
authorities. The fact that South Africa is a pioneer among middle-income
and lower-income countries with regard to collecting such data allows me to
add a new perspective to this research – that of a country that is considerably
poorer and much more unequal than the countries studied previously in the
international literature.
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Chapter 1
Concepts and measures of
saving: Selected issues for
South Africa
South African household savings rates have been declining steadily over the last five
decades, raising concerns that the population structurally under-saves. Against the
background of new saving-promoting policy initiatives, this thesis chapter asks to
what extent the concern is founded, and whether the measurement of saving is
really appropriate to guide economic policy. Comparing different macroeconomic
concepts and measurements of saving, I show that the measure of saving in the
national accounts (the residual between income and expenditure) understates the
household savings rate compared to other measures. Specifically, an alternative
measure from the balance sheets (the change in wealth) yields a significantly higher
and non-declining figure. While households haven’t been ‘putting aside’ their
incomes, they have nevertheless grown richer, driven largely by the appreciation
of asset valuations. I also examine the impact of taking non-financial saving and
wealth into account, and conclude that household sector saving on the aggregate
is higher than the national accounts suggest. However, these adjusted measures
are most relevant for the upper tail of the income and wealth distribution, raising
important distributional concerns.
Keywords: Saving, wealth, measurement and data, national income accounting
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1.1 Introduction
According to the South African national accounts, South African households
save worryingly little. Over the last 50 years household savings rates have
been on a steady decline, falling from about 10 percent of GDP to almost
nothing today. In net terms, household savings rates have been in negative
territory for almost a decade, meaning that they are insufficient to replace
even depreciating capital, let alone fund new investment (see Figure 1.1).
While low levels of saving are widespread across sub-Saharan Africa, the
South African situation is in stark contrast to that of the fast-growing Asian
economies, where household savings rates in excess of 20 or 30 percent of GDP
have often been associated with the successful transition to more dynamic
economies (Commission on Growth and Development, 2008).
In response to these trends, the South African government has launched
a number of initiatives to enhance the country’s savings culture, most recently
through the introduction of tax-free savings accounts in March 2015. The
government’s concern about saving is founded on both micro- and macro-
level considerations. At the household level, the low savings rate means
that households are vulnerable to unexpected losses or expenses and will
face challenges to maintain their living standards during retirement. At
the aggregate level, it increases the reliance on foreign capital inflows to
finance domestic investments. This is thought to increase the vulnerability to
balance of payments shocks and lead to a less competitive market structure,
as larger companies have better access to foreign capital than smaller ones
(National Planning Commission, 2012).
Given the prominence of the savings debate in South Africa, it is
surprising how little attention is currently being paid to understanding what
exactly we are measuring as saving in the national accounts. Saving is by
no means an unequivocally defined concept, and different measures yield
vastly different results. The most commonly used metric (according to
which household saving is nil or negative) stems from the national income
statements, where saving is calculated as the residual between disposable
income and consumption expenditures. If, instead, we look at the balance
8
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sheet side of the national accounts, we find that real household wealth
increased by 5–10 percent of GDP per year over the last decades. Our
assessment of the level of household saving also changes when we consider
investments in physical, human and environmental capital in addition to pure
financial saving and wealth; an adjustment that would add another three to
seven percentage points to the conventionally measured savings rate.
Although one specific measure of saving dominates contemporary
empirical analyses, it is not clear that it is the one measure that corresponds
most closely to the theoretical concepts we try to investigate. Nor would
that be true for the alternative measures of savings. Instead, the variety
of questions asked by economists and economic policymakers—whether low
levels of household savings cause a reliance on foreign capital, to what extent
households are prepared to absorb unexpected losses and expenses in the
short run or retire in the long run, and whether their savings behaviour
corresponds to our models, to name but a few—calls for different concepts
and measures of savings.
The insight that there is no universal or correct measure of saving is
not new. The literature on concepts and measurement of savings dates
back to Henry Simons (1938), John Hicks (1939), Raymond Goldsmith
(1955) and Milton Friedman (1957), and was revived in the 1980s and 1990s
through a large number of empirical studies on the decline in the American
household savings rate (see, for instance, Blades and Sturm, 1982, Boskin,
1991, Browning and Lusardi, 1996, Gale et al., 1999, Perozek and Reinsdorf,
2002). A number of recent studies on different measures of savings have also
been conducted by the National Treasury of New Zealand (most recently by
Gorman et al., 2013), one of the countries with the lowest household savings
rates among the high-income economies.
In this chapter, I attempt to synthesise the main considerations in
selecting such appropriate concepts and measures of saving on the basis of
the existing literature and to apply them to the South African household
sector. In contrast to the contemporary empirical literature on saving in
South Africa, I do not seek to answer whether households save too little or
9
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why they do not save more, but try to take a step back and question whether
our current measures of saving allow us to adequately address such questions
in the first place.
1.2 Two perspectives on saving
1.2.1 Flow and stock concepts of saving
There are two conceptual approaches to defining household saving. The first
concept views saving as the proportion of resources that accrue to a household
over any given period of time, but are not spent on consumption within that
same period. This notion of saving corresponds to the common usage of the
word saving as a verb; such as in “saving money on groceries” or in “saving
for retirement”. The second concept views saving as the accumulation of
wealth—the value of all assets net of all debts—between the beginning and
the end of a specific period. In common language, the use of the word
savings as a noun—such as in “retirement savings” or in “savings for a rainy
day”—expresses this view of saving as the accumulation of wealth. The two
concepts are of course closely related: In accordance with the logic of double-
entry bookkeeping, saving ‘supplied’ through restraint on consumption must
be ‘used’ to build up one’s assets or pay down one’s debts.1 To highlight
this relationship, the literature often refers to the two concepts as ‘flow’ and
‘stock’ or ‘source’ and ‘use’ concepts of saving. Abbreviating them as SF and
SS, respectively, and letting Yt denote available resources, Ct consumption
expenditure, and Wt wealth in period t, the two concepts can be written as:
SF,t = Yt − Ct sf,t = SF,t/GDPt (1.1)
SS,t = Wt −Wt−1 = ∆Wt−1 ss,t = SS,t/GDPt (1.2)
Whilst the stock concept of saving is generally considered to represent
the pure theoretical view of saving as defined by Classical economists (see
1Provided, of course, that they are not destroyed or transferred to others instead. Both
possible alternative ‘uses’ for household sector saving—unreciprocated capital transfers to
foreigners or other institutional sectors, or the destruction of these funds—are, however,
generally small.
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Hicks, 1939, Thuronyi, 1990), the flow concept has come to dominate the
empirical work in post-war, pre-crisis macroeconomics. This is due not only
to the optimistic belief that stocks and flows should be consistent over the
long term, but largely also to the fact that balance sheet data have only
recently become available in most countries.2
If the two concepts of saving yielded similar empirical results, the
predominance of the flow concept in empirical analyses would be of little
interest. However, it tends to be the case that the accumulation of household
wealth exceeds the flow measure of household saving significantly (see,
for example, Peach and Steindel (2000), Perozek and Reinsdorf (2002) or
Piketty and Zucman (2014)). As Figure 1.2 shows, this is also the case
in South Africa: While the flow measure of saving has been declining for
five decades towards levels around zero today, the stock measure of saving is
much higher and—although much more volatile—exhibits no clear downward
trend. While South Africans thus spend almost their entire incomes on
the consumption of goods and services, they nevertheless get collectively
wealthier – by 6.5 percent of GDP per year on average in real terms. Real
household saving as defined in the flow view accounts for less than a quarter
of the increase in real household wealth between 1975 and 2014. This
discrepancy points to the importance of household wealth dynamics that
are not reflected in current-period household saving figures.
1.2.2 Explaining the discrepancy
The discrepancy between the flow and stock measures of saving can be traced
to the rules of national accounting (the System of National Accounts, SNA).
The flow measure of household saving is calculated from the National Income
and Production Accounts (NIPA) as the residual between disposable income
and final consumption expenditure. The stock measure can be calculated
2In South Africa, retrospective household balance sheets were first released in 2006.
Being based on the work of Aron and Muellbauer (2006), these household sector balance
sheets are the first of their kind for a developing country (Aron et al., 2008). Although
select sectoral balance sheets statistics have since become available in Korea, Mexico and
Turkey, South Africa remains one of at most a few emerging economies with complete
household sector balance sheet data today (Stierli et al., 2014).
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Figure 1.1: Savings rates
Note: Savings rates by institutional sector, 1955–2014, net, in percent of GDP.
Figure 1.2: Flow and stock measures of saving
Note: Household sector savings rates, 1975–2014, net, in percent of GDP.
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from the balance sheets as the change in wealth from one period to the next.
This measure not only includes the ‘saving-induced’ increase in wealth, but
also the change in the value of the existing stock of assets as well as the
change in the quantity of assets due to capital transfers (Kt) or other factors






×Wt−1 +Kt +Ot (1.3)
In a fully integrated system of national accounts, the latter three
elements are recorded in the accumulation accounts, which link the NIPA
to the balance sheet. While these accumulation accounts are still under
construction for South Africa, the figures from other countries suggest that
asset revaluations are by far the most important of the three.
Asset revaluations—also referred to as unrealised capital gains or holding
gains (or losses)—occur when asset prices increase or decrease over time. In
contrast to interest, dividends and rents (which are recorded as incomes in
the NIPA and are thus reflected in SF and SS alike), asset revaluations are
‘paper profits’ that affect the balance sheet but not the income statement,
thus driving SS away from SF . Even when gains materialise as assets are
sold at a higher price, they remain unaccounted for in the income statement
and excluded from SF . Since asset revaluations affect primarily real estate
and stocks, the importance of the ‘revaluation effect’ in household wealth
dynamics depends on the importance of these asset classes in household
portfolios as well as on the development of house and stock prices over time:
In periods of booming asset prices, in particular, the wealth dynamics of
households with real estate assets and stock portfolios can become largely
disconnected from their saving as measured in the NIPA.
1.2.3 Which concept is more relevant?
The large and persistent discrepancy between the flow and the stock measures
of saving raises the question which of the two concepts is more relevant. When
studying saving in the context of investment volumes and current account
13
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imbalances—flow variables themselves—the flow measure is generally the
appropriate counterpart. When asking to what extent households can
weather unemployment or retirement, in contrast, their wealth position (and
composition) presumably plays an important role. In studies on household
saving behaviour, again, it is important to take an approach that reflects what
households themselves have in mind when making spending decisions. The
question what households consider as their available resources is, however,
by no means unequivocal.
It is clear from equations (1.1) – (1.3) that the two concepts of saving
would be equivalent if household resources, Yt, were defined to include all
capital gains or losses, net capital transfers and other changes in the volume
of assets in addition to what the SNA currently defines as adjusted disposable
income.3 This would be equivalent to defining income as the sum of an
individual’s consumption expenditure on the one hand and the change in
their wealth on the other – a widely accepted theoretical concept referred
to as ‘Haig-Simons income’ in reference to the work of Robert Haig and
Henry Simons (Thuronyi, 1990). It would also reflect John Hicks’ idea that
“the purpose of income calculations in practical affairs is to give people an
indication of the amount which they can consume without impoverishing
themselves” (Hicks, 1946, p.172), i.e. the amount that they can spend
without reducing their wealth position.
The Haig-Simons view of income (and thus the stock concept of saving)
is consistent with a world in which households are acutely aware of their
net worth and adjust their spending accordingly. If the value of their
retirement fund rises significantly due to a prolonged stock market boom,
for instance, they might find it less pressing to add to these funds by
continuing to forgo current consumption. The definition of income in the
3The definition of disposable income in the NIPA consists of labour incomes (wages,
salaries and social security contributions) and capital incomes (interest, dividends, rents,
and investment income attributable to insurance policyholders) net of all current transfers
(taxes, net social contributions/benefits, other current transfers), with an adjustment
made for the change in household pension entitlements. This adjustment in the ‘use of
disposable income account’ reflects the fact that current contributions can deviate from
current benefits and translate into future claims or liabilities of the household sector on
the financial sector.
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SNA (and thus the flow measure of saving), in contrast, reflects a view
in which households are somewhat more myopic or conservative – taking
their spending decisions solely on accounts of their regular cash receipts.
This may either be because they are unaware of other changes in their net
worth or because they are sceptical about the permanent nature of these
‘windfalls’. It may also be due to financing constraints, particularly when
the majority of capital gains occur on housing assets or interests in long-term
saving products. The wealth effect thus also depends on the liquidity profile
of the portfolio (Aron and Muellbauer, 2000). In terms of Milton Friedman’s
(1957) Permanent Income Hypothesis, which underpins most macroeconomic
models of household consumption and saving behaviour, the definition of
income in the SNA is consistent with a view in which asset revaluations
(including realised gains from buying low and selling high) are seen as purely
transient components of income, while the Haig-Simons income is consistent
with a situation in which households view these gains at least partly as
permanent sources of wealth.
Empirical studies on this matter suggest that the truth lies somewhere
in the middle. In terms of stock market wealth, rising share prices indeed
contribute to rising consumer spending, even though the marginal propensity
to spend out of wealth is smaller than the propensity to spend out of labour
or capital incomes (Poterba, 2000). In the case of housing, too, it is generally
found that households do take the market value of their houses into account
when making their spending decisions, although the propensity to spend out
of illiquid assets is only about half as high as the propensity to spend out of
liquid forms of wealth (Aron and Muellbauer, 2000, 2013).
This discussion supports a cautionary observation: When households
have a different perception of their available resources than we assume in our
models, our conclusions from these models can be seriously misleading. If,
specifically, households take prolonged periods of asset price increases into
account when making their spending decisions, analyses focusing only on the
flow measure of saving will understate to what extent households are actually
making future-oriented decisions. Note, however, that the importance of
15
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this effect probably varies across different subsets of the population, as
wealth tends to be highly unevenly distributed. While the discrepancy
between wealth accumulation and saving, as conventionally measured, is
considerable for the wealthiest households, the two measures of saving are
likely roughly equivalent for households in the lower end of the income and
wealth distribution.
1.3 Towards a concept of genuine saving
The previous section showed that the conceptual discrepancy between the
stock and the flow concept and measure of saving can be boiled down to the
definition of income. Regardless of which definition of income is chosen—
whether the flow or the stock approach to saving is taken—, however,
additional definitional issues arise regarding the definition of consumption
and wealth.
From a stock perspective, it has often been argued that the assets
accounted for in the national accounts (tangible non-financial and financial
assets) cover only a portion of ‘true’ household wealth. On the one hand,
households own tangible assets other than those reported, notably in the
form of durable consumer goods. On the other hand, a large part of ‘true’
household wealth is intangible, particularly when it comes to human or
intellectual capital (Becker, 1975) or to natural or environmental capital
(Arrow et al., 2012, Atkinson and Hamilton, 2007, Hamilton and Clemens,
1999).
If these forms of capital form part of household wealth, it follows that
the expenditures inccurred on building them should be treated as investment
or saving rather than as consumption. From a broadened definition of what
constitutes wealth thus follows a broadened definition of what constitutes
saving. Savings measures adjusted in this vein are sometimes referred to as
measures of “genuine saving” (Hamilton and Clemens, 1999), and are closely
linked to the literature on sustainable development: Using the concept of
genuine saving, economic development can be said to be economically or
16
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environmentally sustainable when the appropriately adjusted savings rates
are non-negative, and unsustainable otherwise (Arrow et al., 2012).
1.3.1 Physical capital
The measure of final consumption expenditure in the NIPA includes
expenditures on durable consumer goods; a category that includes items
such as household furniture and appliances, personal vehicles, computer
equipment and certain recreational goods. While depreciating assets such as
cars or computers are certainly not advisable saving vehicles, they do differ
from other goods and services in that they provide a flow of “consumption
services” for several years beyond the time of purchase and therefore preclude
certain future expenditures.
A range of authors—beginning with John Hicks (1939, Chapter XIV),
Raymond Goldsmith (1955) and Milton Friedman (1957, Chapter V)—have
thus suggested reclassifying durable goods expenditures as investments, by
treating only the current depreciation but not the original outlays as current
consumption. Indeed, the reclassification of durable goods as investments
is probably the most common adjustment to the household saving rate
in the literature (see, for example, Blades and Sturm, 1982, Boskin, 1991,
Gale et al., 1999, Gorman et al., 2013, Perozek and Reinsdorf, 2002).
1.3.2 Human capital
The reason we considered excluding durable goods from the measure of final
consumption expenditure was that they provided consumption services over
longer periods of time. Strictly speaking, education and healthcare services
are consumed immediately, such that this justification is not applicable
here. However, these expenditures have a distinct forward-looking character
as they increase the stock of human capital, which in turn is among the
most important determinants of future prosperity: While the stock of
health impacts the amount of time each individual can spend on income-
or commodity-generating activities, the level of the education affects the
productivity of these activities (Becker, 1975). From this it follows that
17
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education and health should be treated as investments rather than as
consumption expenditures.
The main difference with respect to the reclassification of durable goods
as investments in physical capital is that the stock of human capital and
its depreciation are unobservable and difficult to approximate. In contrast
to tangible assets that wear and tear over a number of years after their
acquisition, the overall economic value of human capital tends to first increase
with time before decreasing later in life (Becker, 1975). There are likely also
differences between the depreciation of education—which humans acquire
during their youth—, training—which they receive during their working life
and which helps to prevent the depreciation of their education—, and that of
health—with which humans are endowed at birth, and which depreciates at
an accelerating speed with age unless investments in healthcare are made to
postpone some of this depreciation. Despite the difficulties in measuring the
stock and depreciation of human capital, a number of authors have attempted
to make appropriate adjustments for human capital investments (see, for
example, Arrow et al., 2012, Blades and Sturm, 1982).
1.3.3 Natural capital
A somewhat more recent major addition to the literature on saving is the
inclusion of natural capital in an economy’s wealth, and thus the formation
or consumption of natural capital in measures of saving or dissaving
(Arrow et al., 2012, Atkinson and Hamilton, 2007, Hamilton and Clemens,
1999, Pearce and Atkinson, 1993).
The consumption of natural capital includes the depletion of natural
resources on the one hand and the degradation of the environment on the
other. The ownership of natural resources is generally clearly determined and
thus at least partly accounted for as assets in the balance sheet, unless in
the cases in which no ownership rights can be exercised or in which mineral
or fuel deposits have not been discovered or are not workable. Changes in
the volume of these natural assets are then recorded in the ‘other changes
in the volume of assets account’ in the accumulation accounts, which are
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currently under construction in South Africa (2008 SNA, Sections 1.46-1.47).
In general, the vast majority of these resources are owned and depleted by
the corporate and public sector rather than the household sector.
The quality of the environment, in contrast, is a public good, which
can neither be easily valued in monetary terms nor attributed to individual
institutional sectors. It seems reasonable to assume that households are the
main beneficiaries of a clean environment, while all three institutional sectors
are jointly responsible for polluting and degrading it. An adjustment for
environmental degradation is thus likely more meaningful on a national level
than for the household sector alone. The World Bank provides estimates for
such economy-wide adjusted savings rates for a large number of countries. For
all major economies, these adjustments lower the conventionally measured
savings rate.
1.4 Aggregation and disaggregation
After having discussed the definition of household income in section 1.2
and the definition of household consumption in section 1.3, this section
discusses the challenges of delineating the household sector itself. Indeed,
the boundaries between the household, the corporate and the public sector
are not clear cut, and household saving is not independent of how much
other sectors save. This is reflected in the frequent observation that total
national saving is more stable over time than either private saving (the sum of
household and corporate saving) or public saving, and that private saving in
turn exhibit greater stability than household or corporate saving considered
separately (Blades and Sturm, 1982, David and Scadding, 1974).4
1.4.1 Household claims on corporate saving
The definition of the household sector in the System of National Accounts
(SNA) comprises not only private households, but also unincorporated
business enterprises of households, non-profit institutions serving households,
4In South Africa, the correlation coefficient between household and corporate sector
savings rates is −0.2 and between private and public sector saving +0.1 (1946-2014).
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as well as private trusts and friendly societies. The main justification for
including unincorporated businesses in the household sector lies with the
unlimited liability of the owners of these businesses, which means that all
household assets are at risk in the case the enterprise declares bankruptcy.
Similarly, non-profit institutions, private trusts and friendly societies are
included because the boundary to private households is not always clear.
Usually, their overall share is relatively small compared to private households.
Incorporated businesses, on the other hand, constitute a separate
institutional sector – although ultimately also owned by private households
via direct shareholdings or indirect interests in pension- or long-term
insurance funds. As a major shareholder, the household sector has claims on
corporate profits. At any point in time, corporations can choose between
paying these profits out as dividends (or through share repurchases) or
holding on to them internally, thus increasing shareholders’ claims on future
payouts instead. The Modigliani-Miller invariance proposition predicts
that shareholders are indifferent between these two options (they “pierce
the corporate veil”), such that dividend payouts always translate into an
equivalent drop in shareholder value (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). As
shown in section 1.2, however, only the stock concept of saving reflects this
theoretical invariance by taking into account price changes in the valuation
of household wealth. For the flow measure of saving in the NIPA, in contrast,
retained profits are entirely accounted as corporate saving until they are paid
out as dividends to households.
In light of the substitutability between corporate and household saving,
although imperfect, it has been suggested that total private saving may
be a more meaningful measure than household saving when flow measures
are used (Blades and Sturm, 1982, Boskin, 1991, David and Scadding, 1974,
Gale et al., 1999). Given the interest in household saving from a theoretical
perspective, and the importance of household saving in most countries in
practice, aggregating over household and corporate saving could stretch the
point. Yet, this discussion certainly suggests that changes in corporate saving
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should be taken into consideration when interpreting changes in the saving
figures as provided by the NIPA.
1.4.2 Household claims on pension and social security funds
A large share of saving of most working-age individuals is not discretionary
but contractual, particularly in the form of contributions to pension schemes.
For the household sector as a whole, the share of contractual saving is closer
to zero, since pension schemes are largely a redistributive process between
working-age and retired individuals. When there is a discrepancy between
current contributions and current benefits, however, it seems straightforward
that these savings should be attributed to households. This is largely the
case under the current SNA.
For all claims that accrue ‘in a predictable fashion or for predictable
reasons’, an adjustment is made in the national accounts to reflect any
deviations between current contributions and current benefits. In the NIPA,
household disposable income is adjusted for the change in the household
sector’s pension entitlements before the flow measure of saving is calculated.
This change in the household sector’s pension entitlements should be
consistent with the change in the interests of households in pension funds
and long-term insurers that are included in the balance sheet. Note, however,
that the qualification of predictability excludes claims under social security
and social assistance schemes. Given the market-based nature of the South
African pension system, this distorts the South African estimates less than
those of the advanced economies in extensive social security systems.
1.5 Other measurement concerns
Since national accounts data are constructed under a number of assumptions
from a variety of sources, they are prone to errors and omissions in the
source data as well as in the aggregation process.5 Measurement errors can be
classified in two groups: systematic errors, whose magnitude can be predicted
5An overview over sources and methods in the South African household sector accounts
is provided in Appendix A.1.
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based on other variables, and non-systematic errors, where this is not the
case. One systematic error in the measurement of saving is the treatment of
inflation, which overstates the saving of net creditors and understates that
of net debtors as will be shown in section 1.5.1 (Jump, 1980). A second
systematic error concerns the discrepancy between excluding capital gains
but including the corresponding taxes in the calculation of disposable income,
which effectively understates saving (Peach and Steindel, 2000). The effects
of other measurement errors are, per their nature, hard to estimate, but will
be discussed in the subsequent section 1.5.3.
1.5.1 Treatment of inflation
One specific measurement error in the national accounts is related to inflation
expectations. Jump (1980) shows that measures of income and saving
contain a spurious element whenever inflation expectations are non-zero.
This bias is related to the inclusion of nominal net interest payments or
receipts in the calculation of sectoral income. Nominal interest rates consist
of two components: a real interest component, and a premium intended to
compensate the creditor for the expected inflation-induced reduction in the
value of the principal. Since both components are included as ‘net interest
receipts’ in the calculation of sectoral income (without deducting losses on the
principal accordingly), a positive inflation premium will overstate the income
of net creditors and understate that of net debtors. Since the household
sector is generally a net creditor to the public and corporate sector, this
spurious element in the measurement of income leads to an overstatement of
household savings rates – particularly in times in which inflation expectations
are high. It also introduces an element spurious correlation between inflation
and savings rates when inflation expectations change over time (Jump, 1980).
To achieve inflation-invariant savings rates, the measured savings figure
can be adjusted by subtracting the product of the (expected) inflation rate
and the net creditor (+) or debtor (−) position of the household sector
towards other sectors and the rest of the world. For the United States, Jump
(1980) finds that inflation-adjusted household savings rates are between one
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and two percentage points lower than the measured rates in the NIPA.
In a more recent estimate, the discrepancy was only one half percentage
points, owing to the decline in American inflation rates since the 1980s
(Perozek and Reinsdorf, 2002).
1.5.2 Treatment of capital gains taxes
Another systematic ‘measurement error’ in the national accounts concerns
the treatment of capital gains taxes. As Peach and Steindel (2000) point
out, realised capital gains from the disposal of assets are excluded from
the calculation of income in the NIPA, on the basis of the principle that
gains and losses from non-produced assets should not enter the current
accounts. On the other hand, taxes on these capital gains are considered
as current transfers when calculating disposable income.6 This asymmetry
thus understates disposable income, and increases the wedge between the
flow and the stock measure of saving. Peach and Steindel (2000) and
Perozek and Reinsdorf (2002) find that excluding these taxes or including
realised capital gains raises the United States household savings rate between
less than one percent (subtracting capital gains taxes) and more than five
percentage points (adding realised capital gains). Again, the stock measure
of saving is not subject to this measurement issue.
1.5.3 The non-observed economy
The most obvious candidate for measurement errors in the national accounts
is the non-observed economy, which ranges from non-monetary transactions
(such as the production of goods and services for own consumption or for
provision free-of-charge to others) to hidden monetary transactions (such as
black-market or underground transactions). The fact that these activities are
missing from administrative sources, however, does not mean that they are
entirely excluded from the national accounts. Since the national accounts are
partly based on survey data, targeted questions can be included in household
6In South Africa, capital gains taxes apply when assets are disposed of (e.g., sold or
bequeathed) at a value that exceeds the base cost. Due to significant tax exemptions on
capital gains, only one third of capital gains were liable to taxation in 2014.
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or enterprise surveys to estimate the size of the informal sector. Alternatively,
statistical estimation and triangulation approaches can be used. When
appropriate imputations are made, only some proportion of non-observed
transactions will be missed in the national accounts (OECD, 2002).
To what extent do these non-observed transactions affect the savings
figures in the national accounts? Since saving is calculated as the residual
between income and consumption expenditure, a bias arises only when some
transactions are reflected in one but not the other measure. In principle,
the internal consistency requirement of the system of national accounts
will prevent such a discrepancy: If reported cigarette consumption exceeds
reported cigarette sales due to smuggling, for instance, an appropriate
imputation is made to the income side of the accounts (2008 SNA, Section
25.28-25.35). However, the existence of non-observed transactions can
contribute to the discrepancy between the flow and stock measures of saving.
This happens when unrecorded production goes towards the formation of
fixed capital rather than towards consumption, such as in the case of do-
it-yourself or black-market construction, maintenance or repair activities
that increase the market value of the housing stock. In countries where
construction activity is largely informal, this could lead to a significant
understatement of the flow measure of saving relative to the stock measure
of wealth accumulation (Gorman et al., 2013).
1.5.4 Is survey data better?
The weaknesses of the ‘macroeconomic’ national accounts data could
point us towards using ‘microeconomic’ survey data instead. Although
household surveys are an important input for the construction of the
national household sector accounts, the two data sources tend to differ
systematically (Deaton, 2005, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i Martin, 2014, Ravallion,
2003). This discrepancy results, in part, from different definitions between
both frameworks. For instance, national accounts define the household
sector more broadly than surveys do, and apply different accounting
practices regarding imputations for non-monetary transactions. However,
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the discrepancy also results from differing errors and omissions within each
dataset (Deaton, 2005, Ravallion, 2003).
Both income and consumption expenditure are generally lower when
constructed from surveys than when taken from the national accounts
(Deaton, 2005, Ravallion, 2003). In South Africa (as in many other
developing countries), this discrepancy is particularly pronounced: Some
South African household surveys capture less than 60 percent of national
accounts income (Van der Berg et al., 2007), compared to a median of 68
percent in a sample of 88 developing countries (Ravallion, 2003). Since
income is usually understated even more substantially than consumption
(Ravallion, 2003), survey data thus understates saving relative to national
accounts data. The downward-bias in income and consumption is partly
due to under-sampling and under-reporting, since wealthier households are
less likely to respond to surveys than poorer households (Deaton, 2005). It
can also result from flaws in the survey design and execution, or from low-
quality responses that respondents give to the numerous survey questions
from which income and consumption figures are constructed (Deaton, 2005).
Overall, Pinkovskiy and Sala-i Martin (2014) suggest that national accounts
give more accurate estimates of the variation in average per-capita income—
and hence saving—than surveys do – although they cannot provide any
insight on the distribution of savings on the level of households.
When taking the stock rather than the flow approach, survey data are
even less likely to yield accurate information. Non-response is frequent in
wealth-related surveys because wealth is considered a socially sensitive issue.
When households do choose to respond, they generally find it difficult to
estimate the value of their assets. Because survey data on wealth is so
noisy, “differencing an already noisy series (wealth) can lead to very high
(and spurious) variability in the saving level” (Browning and Lusardi, 1996,
p. 1814). Despite all their shortcomings, national accounts data might thus
still be our best source for empirical analyses on income, consumption, wealth
and saving of the household sector on the aggregate level.
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1.6 South African household saving
1.6.1 Data
I use the household sector NIPA and balance sheet data for the household
sector provided by the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). While the
institutional sector accounts of the NIPA date to 1946, the balance sheet
data—first compiled in 2006—only go back to 1975. The full integration
between the balance sheet and the NIPA via the accumulation accounts is
still ongoing at the time of this writing.
I express all savings rates in net terms and as a percentage of GDP.
The choice between gross and net data is based on the economic logic
that depreciation cannot be consumed: From a microeconomic perspective,
households presumably seek to save and accumulate assets beyond what
is needed to offset the wear and tear of their existing assets; from a
macroeconomic angle, it is net rather than gross savings that constitute the
resources for new investments in the economy (Boskin, 1991). Moreover, only
the net measure of saving in the NIPA is directly comparable to the change
in wealth in the balance sheet: Since the balance sheet values household
assets at fair value, depreciation is implicitly taken into account in the wealth
figures. The choice of the denominator is simply based on the the greater
transparency of using of GDP over other measures, such as disposable income.
Because depreciation expenses are fairly stable over time, the choice
between gross and net measures does not affect the measured trend. This
is, however, not the case for the choice of the denominator. The disposable
income share of South African households bounced around quite significantly,
from highs of around 70 percent of GDP in the 1990s to lows of less than 60
percent in the 1980s and 2000s. It should thus be kept in mind that the choice
of this denominator could overstate the measured decline in households’
propensity to save over the past two decades.
26
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.6. SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSEHOLD SAVING
1.6.2 Adjustments: Flow and stock measures of saving
Figure 1.2 shows that the flow and stock measures of saving differ both in level
and in trend. While the flow measure is low and steadily downward trending
(from more than 10 percent of GDP in the 1960s to negative levels today), the
stock measure is much higher and—although much more volatile—without
any long-term trend. Between 1975 and 2014, South African households
saw their wealth increase by 6.5 percent per year on average in real terms;
significantly higher than the flow measure of saving would suggest.7 Overall,
real household wealth quadrupled between 1975 and 2014, whereby only
fifteen percent of the increase can be explained through compound household
savings over that period.
As discussed in section 1.2, the discrepancy between the flow and the
stock measure of saving stems from revaluations on the existing stock of
assets on the one hand and from capital transfers and other changes in the
volume of assets on the other. In a fully integrated set of national accounts,
these three elements could be easily read from the accumulation accounts,
which consist of the revaluations account, the capital account, and the ‘other
changes in the volume of assets account’. At the time of this writing, however,
only the capital account has been published by the SARB. Assuming that
the ‘other changes in the volume of assets account’ is roughly zero as it is in
other countries, the residual between SS (9.0 percent), SF (−1.4 percent) and
the capital account (0.5 percent) is then primarily due to asset revaluations
(9.9 percent in 2014).
The revaluations component can also be estimated from a bottom-up
approach. Formally speaking, the value of household assets equals the sum-
product of the quantity and the current price of each asset, such that the
change in the value of assets—and hence in wealth—between two points in
time can be decomposed into a quantity effect (a change in the quantity of
7The stock measure of saving is calculated as the increase in wealth between the




same period of time (1975–2014), the average annual increase in wealth, Ss =
(Wt−Wt−1)
Wt−1
was 13.3 percent per year in nominal terms and 3.5 percent per year in real terms, as
inflation averaged 9.8 percent over the 40-year period.
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assets relative to liabilities at constant prices) and a revaluation effect (a
price-induced increase in the value of assets over inflation) by applying a
standard growth accounting procedure (described in Appendix A.2). Since
real estate and equities are the main asset classes that generate holding gains
and losses, we can calculate the revaluation effects as long as we know the
value of housing and stocks in household portfolios and the development of
their prices relative to consumer price inflation.
Consider real estate first. In 2014, housing constituted 24 percent
of assets of the South African household sector, while mortgage advances
constituted 48 percent of liabilities. Since mortgage advances are not only
used to finance new housing but are taken out by existing homeowners to
finance other purchases, the true ‘housing wealth’ lies somewhere between the
value of housing assets and the residual between housing assets and mortgage
liabilities (Scobie and Henderson, 2009).8 Between 1975 and 2014, residential
house prices increased by 10.8 percent per year while consumer price inflation
averaged 9.8 percent.9 Over the 40-year period, this small gap between
house- and consumer price inflation resulted in a roughly 50 percent increase
of house prices relative to consumer prices. Using the growth accounting
procedure, we find that 58 percent of the increase in real house prices can
be attributed to real additions to the housing stock, while the remaining 42
percent are due to real revaluations. The revaluation effect was particularly
pronounced between 2000 and 2008, where house prices grew strongly while
inflation remained low (see Figure 1.3). In 2014, the increase in household
wealth driven by real revaluations of housing assets amounted to 1.3 percent
of GDP; if mortgages are subtracted, the figure is 0.9 percent. While these
figures are substantial when compared to the unadjusted flow measure of
saving, they explain only a very small proportion (roughly 10 percent) of the
discrepancy from the stock measure. They are also very small compared to
8The relative importance of real estate assets in South African household portfolios is
low compared to other countries, since pension assets constitute the single largest category
of assets. In the OECD, housing accounts for almost 70% of total household assets, as
pensions are organised through pay-as-you-go schemes.
9Calculations on the basis of the middle-segment house price index provided by ABSA.
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many advanced economies, in which real house price increases were the main
driver of private wealth accumulation over the last decades.
Turn, thus, to equities. While the SARB records the financial assets
of the household sector not by asset class but by the financial institution
through which they are held (“assets with monetary institutions”, “interest
in pension funds and long-term insurers” and “other financial assets”), the
amount of equities held by households can be estimated from the balance
sheets of the relevant counterparties (public and private pension funds and
long-term insurers on the one hand and unit trusts on the other). Using this
procedure, we arrive at a substantial equity share in household portfolios,
at almost 60 percent of financial assets or over 40 percent of total assets.10
Comprehensive counterparty balance sheet data are only available since 1990.
Since this point in time, stock prices increased by 12.4 percent per year in
nominal terms, or 4.7 percent per year in real terms at an average inflation
rate of 7.8 percent. Using the growth accounting procedure again, we find
that 93 percent of the real increase in the value of household equity portfolios
were due to revaluation. Most recently, the revaluation effect amounted to 8.6
percent of GDP per year, thus roughly explaining the remaining 90 percent
of the discrepancy between the stock and the flow measure.
Is such a high revaluation effect on stocks plausible? The South African
equity market has indeed performed remarkably well since the inception of
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) in 1887. According to the Cre´dit
Suisse Global Investment Returns Yearbook (Dimson et al., 2015), the JSE
generated real returns of 7.4 percent per year on average since 1900 – the
highest among the 23 countries covered in the Yearbook. Over the same
time, the real exchange rate depreciated by only 0.9 percent per year against
the US dollar. The annualised real returns on equities were even higher in
more recent decades than in the earlier years of the JSE. Since 1965, South
African shares generated real returns of 8.0 percent per year, the equivalent
10To estimate the composition of the financial assets of households, I apply the aggregate
portfolio composition of official pension and provident funds, private self-administered
pension funds and long-term insurers to the household sector’s ‘interest in pension funds
and long-term insurers’, and the portfolio composition of unit trusts to the ‘other financial
assets’ bucket. Household ‘assets with monetary institutions’ are simply cash equivalents.
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Figure 1.3: Wealth decomposition
Note: Decomposition of the annual real increase in real estate (top panel) and equities
holdings (bottom panel) into quantity and price effects, in ZAR billions (2000 CPI = 100).
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figure since 2000 is 9.6 percent. Due to the strong home bias of South African
investors, it is likely that South African households benefited sizably from
these gains.11
1.6.3 Adjustments: Towards a measure of genuine saving
Physical capital
The vast majority of household final consumption expenditure in South
Africa goes towards non-durable goods and services. In 2014, the share
of durables stood at only 8.7 percent of household final consumption
expenditure or at 5.3 percent of GDP, 1.3 percentage points above the
estimated depreciation of these durables (3.0 percent of GDP). Adding this
number back to the flow savings rate raises sf from −1.4 to −0.2 percent of
GDP.12 Since net investment in durables has been relatively stable, however,
this adjustment does not reverse the downward trend of the household savings
rate over the last decades. For the two decades between 1995 and 2014,
average net investment in durable goods amounted to 1.4 percent of GDP,
raising the average savings rate from 0.2 percent to 1.6 percent of GDP.13
This adjustment is broadly in line with that for the advanced economies:
According to a survey by Gorman et al. (2013), the capitalisation of durable
11The majority of equities is generally held indirectly, through pension or long-term
insurance funds or other collective investment schemes. These ‘interests in pension
funds and long-term insurers’ and ‘other financial assets’ constitute more than half of
all household assets. Owing to the history of controls regarding capital and exchange
outflows, the large majority of equities held through such schemes is likely domestic.
Under the current prudential rules of the SARB the foreign exposure of pension funds
is restricted to 25% of retail assets; in the case of collective investment funds, long-term
insurance funds and other institutional investors, this share cannot exceed 35% of assets
under management; although an additional allowance in the order of five percent of assets
exists for African assets in both cases (see Section O – F.6 in the SARB Exchange Control
Manual).
12See Appendix A.3 for an overview over the calculation of depreciation expenses.
13Since the household balance sheets in the national accounts report “net wealth
including consumer durable goods” as a memo-item, the same adjustment can also be
made from a stock perspective. Using this figure for the calculation of the savings rate
increases ss by 1.3 percentage points (22.2 compared to 20.8 percent) in 2014 and by 1.6
percentage points (20.8 compared to 19.2 percent) for the 20-year period between 1995 and
2014. The 0.2 percentage point difference in the longer-term adjustment is presumably
due to differences in the methodology used to estimate depreciation.
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goods has an impact of up to three percentage points in the United States,
between 1.0 and 1.8 percentage points in Europe and between 0.4 and 1.0
percentage points in New Zealand and Australia.
Human capital
In principle, net investments in human capital can be reclassified analogously
to the way we just reclassified net investments in physical capital. In practice,
this adjustment is harder to make; both because of limited data on actual
expenditures on human capital formation and because of the conceptual
and methodological difficulties in estimating the associated depreciation
expenses.
Household expenditures on education are grouped together with
expenditures on recreational and entertainment services in the NIPA, forming
a category that jointly amounts to 3.3 percent of GDP. Survey data suggests
that educational services contribute roughly half to this bucket, amounting
to 1.6 percent of GDP.14 Household expenditures on healthcare (medical
services, medical insurance and medical or pharmaceutical products) are
significantly higher, amounting to 4.6 percent of GDP in 2014. However, only
a part of these expenditures actually contribute to future productive activity
and are thus ‘investments’ in the economic sense. If the productive share of
healthcare expenditures were only half, the gross investment in health capital
would fall 2.3 percent of GDP, more similar to the estimate for education.
Taken together, at least 6.5–10.2 percent of South African household
consumption expenditure or 3.9–6.2 percent of GDP goes towards the
formation of human capital. As discussed in section 1.3.2, the depreciation
of human capital investments is unobservable and hard to estimate. In the
absence of depreciation, the South African household savings rate could
be adjusted upwards by the full 3.9–6.2 percentage points. The zero
depreciation assumption is plausible for healthcare: In contrast to education,
14The Income and Expenditure Survey is conducted every five years since 1995 by
Statistics South Africa (StatsSA), and reports the share of education in total household
expenditure as 1.8% in 1995, 2.8% in 2000 and 2005, and 2.7% in 2010. The National
Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS) is conducted biannually since 2008 by the University of
Cape Town, and reports a share of 3.1% in 2008, 2.8% in 2010 and 2.7% in 2012.
32
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.6. SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSEHOLD SAVING
humans inherit their stock of health at birth rather than building it up
through investments — expenditures on medical services and pharmaceutical
products thus only serve to mitigate the inevitable depreciation, and
don’t in themselves depreciate. In the case of education, however, some
depreciation is likely. Under a depreciation rate of 8.5 percent (based on an
adjusted estimate from the literature), the reclassification of expenditures
on education would increase the savings rate by only 0.9 percentage points,
bringing the total adjustment for human capital down to +3.2–5.5 percentage
points.15
While comparable figures are not available for a broad range of
countries, a comparison with New Zealand (+0.5 percentage points) suggests
that the adjustment to the South African savings rate is relatively high
(Gorman et al., 2013). This is likely due to the fact that households bear a
larger share of healthcare and education expenditures in South Africa than
in the advanced economies, where these items are largely funded through
social security systems.
Natural capital
For natural or environmental capital, we can resort to estimates provided
by the World Bank. These estimates, available only on the national
level, consider carbon dioxide damage and particulate emission damage
(environmental degradation) as well as for energy, minerals and net forest
depletion (natural resources depletion). For South Africa, the estimated
adjustments to the national savings rate amounted to −1.8 percent of GDP
from the former, and −4.8 percent from the latter.16
As discussed previously, the depletion of natural resources can likely be
attributed to the corporate and public sectors in cause and consequence.
While environmental degradation is also caused by all sectors, it affects
households first and foremost. From that perspective, the ‘dissaving’ in terms
15The extent to which education depreciates in different phases of life is a debated topic,
and I made several assumptions to arrive at the above estimate of a non-zero depreciation
rate. Appendix A.3 provides an overview over these assumptions.
16Latest available data for 2013. Source: World Bank Development Indicators database
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of environmental quality in the order of −1.8 percent of GDP constitutes an
upper bound for an adjustment to the South African household savings rate.
1.7 Conclusion
The comparison of different concepts and measures of saving stresses one
main point: Since there is no single ‘correct’ measure of saving, a careful
choice of the most relevant concept and measure is an important step in any
analysis of the level of saving or the saving behaviour of households.
Table 1.1 summarises the adjustments to the conventionally measured
savings rate for South Africa: While the flow measure of saving stood at −1.4
percent and the stock measure of saving at 9.0 percent in 2014, the measure
of genuine saving is estimated at up to 16.5 percent of GDP – a considerably
higher number.
The most important distinction is that between the balance sheet and
the income statement view of saving: While households haven’t been “putting
aside” their incomes according to the latter concept, they have nevertheless
grown richer, driven largely by favourable asset price developments that
are not reflected in conventional measures of income. Although detailed
revaluation accounts are still under construction in South Africa, the
available data suggest that this owes primarily to the exceptional appreciation
of domestic corporate equities over the last decades. Chapter 2 of this thesis
will investigate the sources of this appreciation, and compare the results for
South Africa to those in the advanced world.
While the growth in aggregate household wealth paints a less worrisome
picture than the low conventionally measured saving rates, it raises important
distributional questions. Since wealth tends to be highly concentrated, it
is highly probable that asset revaluations have disproportionately benefited
a small share of the South African population. As a result, true savings
inequality is likely even more pronounced than conventional forms of
measurement suggest. Chapter 3 of this thesis will attempt to shed more
light on the distribution of wealth (and therefore saving) among the South
African population.
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Table 1.1: Overview of adjustments
Measure/Adjustment Impact Savings rate
Gross saving 0.1%
Consumption of fixed capital −1.5
Net saving (sf ) −1.4%
Capital transfers +0.5
Real revaluations: Real estate +0.9− 1.3
Real revaluations: Equities∗ +8.6− 9.0
Change in real net wealth (ss) 9.0%
Physical capital: Durable goods +1.3
Human capital: Education +0.9− 1.6
Human capital: Healthcare +2.3− 4.6
Natural capital: Environment −1.8− 0.0
Genuine saving (s′f ) 11.7− 16.5%
Note: Adjustments to the South African headline savings rate, 2014, in percentage points
(impact) and in percent of GDP (savings rate).
∗Real equity valuations calculated as a residual since stock holdings for 2014 not available.
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Chapter 2
Private wealth in a developing
country: Evidence from South
Africa
The point of departure of Thomas Piketty’s influential Capital in the Twenty-
First Century (2014) was the strong growth of private wealth-income ratios in
the advanced economies between 1970 and 2010. Using official household-sector
balance sheet data for South Africa—the first country in the developing world to
publish such data—, this chapter examines to what extent this re-emergence of
private wealth was also experienced in the developing-country context. First, we
find that the South African current wealth-income ratio is very close to its level in
1975 (255 and 240 percent), and thus much lower than those of Piketty’s sample of
advanced economies (where it increased from 200–300 to 400–700 percent). Second,
I show that the discrepancy is explained not only by South Africa’s relatively low
savings rates, but also by the reduction of wealth before and during the transition
to democracy in the 1990s. Since the late 1990s, however, private wealth recovered
significantly, indicating that South Africa might resemble the advanced economies
more closely in the future.
Keywords: Saving; wealth; asset accumulation
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2.1 Introduction
Until recently (and as shown in Chapter 1), the macroeconomic literature
on developing countries was primarily concerned with the flows of income
and expenditure rather than with the stocks of assets and liabilities. This
owes not only to the theoretical notion that flows and stocks are consistent
over the long term, but also to the scarcity of reliable balance sheet data for
empirical analyses: While flow variables have been recorded in the national
accounts since the 1940s, stock variables are only gradually being included
in official statistics.
When Thomas Piketty used these novel balance sheet data for a sweeping
account of the accumulation and distribution of wealth in the major advanced
economies, it nevertheless attracted considerable attention. Capital in the
Twenty-First Century (2014) showed how private wealth re-emerged in
the second half of the twentieth century following the great contraction
during and after the world wars, approaching levels last seen in the rentier-
societies of nineteenth-century Europe in several countries. As wealth gains
importance over incomes, wealth inequality—which typically exceeds income
inequality significantly—is likely to play an increasing role in shaping overall
inequality, therefore raising the redistributive potential of capital relative to
labour-related taxes: In an environment where national income is dwarfed
by private wealth, the redistribution of income alone is likely insufficient
to effectively reduce overall inequality (see also Piketty and Zucman, 2014,
2015).
Although Piketty’s analyses were confined to the largest advanced
economies, his work has been highly influential even in the developing world,
and particularly South Africa (as seen, for example, in the 2015 report of
the Davis Tax Committee on estate tax reform). But to what extent are
his conclusions really applicable to emerging economies, in which persisting
capital scarcity tends to cause at least as much concern as increasing wealth
concentration?
In this chapter, I use the South African household sector balance sheets
(which were introduced in Chapter 1) to compare the South African situation
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to that in the advanced economies. With retrospective estimates dating back
to 1975, private wealth can be traced over the same period in which the
wealth-income ratios of rich countries expanded from their historic low-point
of about 200–300 percent to their current levels of 400–700 percent.
First, I compare the wealth-income ratios of South Africa and the
eight major advanced economies over the 1975–2010 horizon, and use
Piketty and Zucman’s methodology to decompose their development into
quantity (saving-induced) and price (revaluation-induced) effects. While I
find that South Africa was still comparable to the rich countries at the
beginning of this period (with a wealth-income ratio of 240 percent in
1975), the developments diverged thereafter: Rather than experiencing an
emergence of private wealth, South Africa’s wealth-income ratio of 255
percent today is very close to its level in 1975. While South Africa’s
structurally lower savings rate contributed to this divergence, the relatively
less pronounced asset price boom also played a role.
Second, I study the South African wealth-income ratio over time, as
the long-term view masks important shorter-term dynamics. Rather than
remaining stable as the comparison between 1975 and 2014 suggests, wealth-
income ratios actually trended downward from the mid-1980s to the mid-
1990s, reflecting dwindling asset prices in a period of economic sanctions
against the apartheid regime and political uncertainty over the transfer of
power. From the late 1990s onwards, private wealth recovered, as asset price
increases more than compensated for steadily falling savings rates. While
South Africa’s wealth-income ratio is thus still substantially lower than those
of the advanced economies, it appears to be on a trajectory to resemble them
more closely in the future.
The fact that aggregate private wealth is still lower than in the advanced
economies could also be misleading with regard to its importance in shaping
the structure of inequality. Although higher wealth-income ratios have been
associated with higher capital shares in the functional distribution of income,
capital receives a much higher share of total income in South Africa than
in any of the countries in Piketty’s sample (40 percent compared to 25–30
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percent). Private wealth in South Africa generates thus disproportionately
high returns for their owners, which tend to constitute a much smaller group
than the recipients of other incomes. This indicates that the distributional
concerns raised by Piketty’s observations for the advanced economies could
nevertheless be shared in South Africa.
2.2 Data and methodology
2.2.1 Data
The reason the empirical literature on wealth is still young is that
reliable balance sheet data are much newer than flow data on incomes
and expenditures. While the System of National Accounts (SNA)—the
international standard for national accounting—was first published in 1953,
recommendations on the compilation of sectoral balance sheets were only
included in 1993. Since the 2000s, these recommendations have gradually
been implemented in most advanced economies, whereby official balance
sheet data were released as early as 1970 in France and as late as 2010
in Germany (Piketty, 2011, Piketty and Zucman, 2014).
In South Africa, the first retrospective household sector balance sheets
were included in the national accounts in 2006, and now span over four
decades (1975–2014). Although some data have since become available in
Korea, Mexico, Taiwan and Turkey, South Africa remains one of at most a few
emerging economies (and even fewer lower- and middle income economies)
with complete household sector balance sheet data today (Alvaredo et al.,
2016, Stierli et al., 2014).1
1There is no authoritative overview to what extent different countries have implemented
sectoral balance sheets. According to an IMF conference paper on this subject
(Shreshta et al., 2011, p.10), Korea had complete sectoral financial and non-financial
balance sheets in 2011 while Mexico had sectoral financial balance sheets compiled through
the OECD. According to the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report, in contrast, Korea and
Mexico both provide only financial balance sheets for the household sector, and South
Africa is the only developing country with sectoral balance sheets today. The World
Income and Wealth Database contains information on wealth-income ratios in Mexico,
Korea and Taiwan (Alvaredo et al., 2016).
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To ensure comparability with Piketty’s data and analyses, this chapter
uses the same standard concepts of saving and wealth. The fact that South
Africa’s balance sheet data was modeled by Aron and Muellbauer (2006)
after the United Kingdom should ensure the comparability of the resulting
estimates.
Private wealth-income ratios are calculated by dividing household
sector wealth (“wealth”) through net national income (“income”), and are
decomposed into savings- and revaluations-induced components using net
savings rates (“saving”) calculated straight from the national income and
production accounts (as saving net of depreciation over net national income).
The reason for using household sector balance sheets to measure private
wealth is that all assets and liabilities of the corporate sector are ultimately
owned by their shareholders – households, government entities or foreigners.
Household sector balance sheets thus capture the wealth of the corporate
sector to the extent that these businesses are owned by South African private
residents (as opposed to public sector or the rest of the world). The reason
for considering only the flow measure of saving in this chapter is not only that
it ensures consistency with Piketty’s work on the advanced economies, but
also because it would be somewhat circular to explain the change in wealth
through a savings rate that is calculated as the change in wealth. Appendix
A.1 provides more details on the concepts and measures used in this chapter.
2.2.2 Decomposition methodology
The change in the value of assets between two points in time depends on
the change in the quantity of assets at constant prices and the change
in their respective market prices. As shown in Chapter 1, the quantity
effect corresponds broadly with what is measured as saving in the national
accounts, allowing us to talk about a saving-induced and a revaluation-
induced component of any change in wealth.
I follow the multiplicative decomposition methodology of the change
in the value of assets that was proposed by Piketty and Zucman (2014).
Denoting real wealth and real asset prices (asset prices relative to consumer
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prices) at the end of period t as Wt and Pt, and denoting real income and
the savings rate during period t as Yt and st, real wealth at the end of period
t+ 1 can be expressed as




Denoting the total growth rate of wealth between period t and t+ 1 as gwt+1,
the saving-induced growth rate of wealth as gw,st+1 and the revaluation-induced
growth rate of wealth as gw,rt+1, this equation can be rewritten as











. Finally, denoting the growth rate
of income as gyt , the change in the wealth-income ratio β between two years
becomes
βt+1 =





The dynamics of the wealth-income ratio thus depend on the growth
in wealth relative to the growth in incomes. Letting growth rates without
subscripts denote compound annual growth rates over a period spanning n
years, the decomposition of a change in wealth and the wealth-income ratio
over time can be generalised through equations (2.3) and (2.4):
Wt+n = (1 + g
w,s)n(1 + gw,r)nWt (2.3)
βt+n =
(1 + gw,s)n(1 + gw,r)n
(1 + gy)n
βt (2.4)
Over the long term, asset price should not diverge systematically from
the prices of goods and services, and the valuation effect should ultimately
even out (gw,rt = 0). In the steady-state—characterised by stable savings and
growth rates—the wealth-income ratio converges toward the ratio between
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the savings rate and the growth rate of income:
βt+n → β = s
gy
(2.5)
This equation is the steady-state result of standard neoclassical growth
models and a mathematical identity as long as s and gy are constant and
gw,rt is zero (Piketty and Zucman, 2014).
In their joint paper on wealth-income ratios in rich countries,
Piketty and Zucman (2014) find that this steady-state prediction indeed
describes wealth dynamics reasonably well over the very long run and at
highly aggregated levels. Over shorter horizons in individual countries,
however, valuation effects remain important, causing the wealth-to-income
ratio to deviate from the saving-induced level. The shorter the horizon, the
more the wealth-income ratio is also determined by the initial wealth-income
ratio at the beginning of the period under analysis, requiring a different
explanation for finite horizons.
First, the growth rate of wealth is decomposed into a saving-induced
and a price-induced component. For this purpose, equation (2.3) is rewritten
as:
(1 + gw)n = (1 + gw,s)n(1 + gw,r)n (2.3’)
The cumulative growth of wealth, (1 + gw)n = (1 + gwt+1) × ... × (1 + gwt+n)
can be calculated from annual balance sheet data on wealth, Wt, ...,Wt+n.
Analogously, the cumulative saving-induced growth rate of wealth (1 +
gw,s)n = (1+gw,st+1)× ...× (1+gw,st+n) can be calculated from data on st, ..., st+n
and βt, ..., βt+n, using the definition that g
w,s
t+1 = st+1 × Yt+1/Wt. Taking the
n-th root yields the uniform-growth-weighted average annual rates gw and
gw,s. The revaluation-induced component is the residual.
These rates can then be used to decompose the wealth-income ratio
into three components: the impact of the initial wealth-income ratio, βini, a
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saving-induced component βsav and a revaluation-induced component, βrev:
βt+n = βini + βsav + βrev (2.6)
βini = βt × 1
(1 + gw)n
(2.6a)








2.2.3 Which savings rate?
I have argued that the household sector balance sheets are a good measure
for the wealth of the entire private sector, because they include the assets
and liabilities of the South African corporate sector to the extent that these
businesses are owned by South African private residents (as opposed to
public sector or the rest of the world). Saving, in contrast, is recorded
separately for the household and the corporate sector, regardless of the
fact that the household sector can ultimately claim corporate savings as the
major shareholder of domestic corporations. In light of the substitutability
of corporate and household saving (which was also discussed in Chapter 1),
Piketty and Zucman use the private rather than the household savings rate
in decomposing private wealth.
However, this approach is not without limitations either. While the
household sector is generally the largest shareholder of a country’s corporate
sector, it is not the only one – most corporations are at least partially owned
by foreigners and/or the government. Similarly, households typically own
at least some shares in foreign companies, despite the home bias in equity
portfolios. Piketty and Zucman argue that their approach remains a good
approximation because government ownership has become fairly small across
countries, while net foreign asset positions are largely balanced (implying that
each country gives and receives a comparable share of corporate savings).
However, the approximation might be less valid in the context of developing
countries, where state-owned enterprises constitute a substantial share of the
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corporate sector. Moreover, it seems that large discrepancies in the corporate
savings rates across countries would also render the approximation less valid,
even where net foreign asset positions are relatively small.
As Piketty and Zucman point out in their Data Appendix, the national
accounts do not systematically report bilateral flows between the resident
institutional sectors and the rest of the world, such that there is no
straightforward way to improve the matching between private wealth and
saving. For consistency with these authors I therefore still use the private
savings rate, but complement all analyses with estimates using the household
savings rate as well.
2.3 Private wealth and its composition
2.3.1 Wealth-income ratios
In 2014 South Africa’s private wealth stood at 255 percent of national income;
in 2010—the end of Piketty’s horizon—just above 230 percent. How does this
compare with the eight advanced economies?
As Table 2.1 shows, South Africa’s 2010 wealth-income ratio was about
40 percent lower than that of Germany, Canada and the United States, and
60 percent lower than that of Italy or France. While this is in line with the
prediction that developing countries are less capital-abundant and capital-
intensive than advanced economies, a higher wealth-income ratio would not
have been surprising for a middle-income country that is known for its
extraordinary riches – platinum mines, industrial farms, globally operating
corporations and the luxury real estate of the Western Cape.
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 also show that the discrepancy between South
Africa and the advanced economies was considerably less pronounced back
in the 1970s. In 1975, South Africa’s wealth-income ratio was on par
with Canada’s, and even exceeded Germany’s. This suggests that today’s
discrepancy between South Africa and these countries is not explained by
a structurally lower wealth-income ratio of South Africa as a developing
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country, but by the specific developments that drove the rise of the wealth-
income ratios of the rich countries over the past four decades.
Yet, the comparison between 1975 and today masks the dynamics within
the last decades. While the advanced economies experienced a pronounced
increase of the wealth-income ratio over the entire period, the South African
development was U-shaped: Between the late 1970s and the late 1990s, the
wealth-income ratio declined from over 260 percent to about 190 percent,
only to return to earlier levels in the subsequent decade and a half (see
Figure 2.2). While still more moderate, the increase of 60 percentage points
over the last 15 years thus has started to resemble the trend of the advanced
economies over the last four decades.
2.3.2 Wealth composition
Before proceeding to the drivers of wealth accumulation, it is useful to
consider the composition of wealth. In most countries and for most
individuals, housing assets constitute the bulk of their wealth (OECD, 2015).
It is thus remarkable that housing constitutes merely one quarter of total
private assets in South Africa, compared to an average share of 40 percent
in Piketty’s sample. Given the low asset-to-income ratio, the discrepancy
is even bigger: As shown in table 2.2, housing assets amount to 75 percent
of national income in South Africa, compared to 180–380 percent in the
advanced economies.
The low housing share implies that three quarters of assets in South
Africa are financial, with interests in pension funds and long-term insurers
constituting the single largest category. The importance of pension assets
for South African households is less surprising when considering that
the domestic pension system is almost entirely capitalised and privately
administered. This characteristic of the retirement fund landscape dates back
to the 1980s and 1990s, when the industry experienced a sweeping transition
from partially funded defined benefit to fully funded defined contribution
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Table 2.1: Private wealth-income ratios, 1975 and 2010
β in 1975 β in 2010 ∆ 1975–2010
South Africa 240 231 −9
United States 320 410 90
Canada 242 416 174
Japan 386 601 215
Australia 349 518 169
Germany 229 412 183
United Kingdom 301 522 221
France 317 575 258
Italy 321 676 355
Note: Private wealth-income ratios, 1975 and 2010, % of national income. Data for
advanced economies from Piketty and Zucman (2014).
Table 2.2: Portfolio composition, 2010
Asset class South Africa Piketty-8
Residential buildings 26 40
Other non-financial assets 6 5
Total non-financial assets 32 45
Pension funds and life insurance 36 19
Equities and fund shares 21 16
Currency, deposits, bonds and loans 12 20
Total financial assets 68 55
Total assets 100 100
Note: Household sector portfolio composition, 2010, in percent of total assets. Piketty-
8 denotes national-income weighted averages for Piketty’s sample of eight advanced
economies, calculated based on Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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Figure 2.1: Private wealth-income ratios, 1900–2010
Note: Private wealth-income ratios, 1900–2010, in percent of national income. Data for
advanced economies from Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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Figure 2.2: Private wealth-income ratio, 1975–2014
Note: South African private wealth-income ratio, 1975–2014, in percent of national income.
Maximum, minimum, 1975, 2010 and 2014 marked.
Figure 2.3: Portfolio composition, 1975–2014
Note: Portfolio composition, 1975–2014, in percent of national income.
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arrangements – a transition that is reflected in the stark increase of financial
assets between 1975 and 1995 (see Figure 2.3).2
In most advanced economies, in contrast, pension liabilities are generally
not fully funded. Particularly in Continental Europe, most pension schemes
are administered by the social security system, and function on a pay-
as-you-go basis. Under the accounting rules of the SNA, such pension
entitlements are not recorded on households’ balance sheets, which explains
the comparatively low share of pension assets in Piketty’s sample. Even
in countries like the United Kingdom and the United States, where the
retirement landscape is more diverse, pension wealth constitutes at most
a quarter of total assets; in Continental Europe the share is less than 15
percent.3
2.4 Decomposing the wealth-income ratio
2.4.1 International comparison
Steady state decomposition
Table 2.3 shows the average savings and growth rates for South Africa and
Piketty’s eight rich countries between 1970 and 2010. Over this period, real
national incomes in South Africa grew at gy = 2.5 percent per year, while the
2Although many public sector employees are still covered by defined benefit schemes,
the majority of private sector employees are now covered by defined contribution
arrangements, sponsored by employers, employer groups or trade unions. Under both
models, the occupational pensions are currently at least partially funded. Only the
government old-age grant, intended to prevent old-age poverty irrespective of previous
employment, is funded from current government revenue rather than through funds. For
more than three quarters of South Africans in retirement age, the means-tested old-age
grant of at most 1,410 ZAR per month in 2014 (ca. 100 USD) constitutes the main source
of income (National Treasury, 2004, 2012).
3Whether the structure of the pension system also impacts on overall wealth is unclear.
Under privately administered pension schemes, the corresponding assets (of households)
and liabilities (of financial corporations) are recorded on the sectoral balance sheets.
Under social security schemes, in contrast, both assets (of households) and liabilities (of
the general government) are unrecorded. From an accounting perspective, the measures
of wealth should thus not be distorted. From a behavioural perspective, however, the
presence of social security pensions might reduce the accumulation of private wealth ceteris
paribus.
50
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.4. DECOMPOSING THE WEALTH-INCOME RATIO
private savings rate s averaged less than eight percent of national income.
In terms of the growth rate, South Africa ranks in the middle of the sample,
owing largely to much higher-than-average population growth. In terms of
saving, in contrast, South Africa ranks close to the bottom. In that context, it
is worth noting the composition of saving: While the importance of household
saving relative to corporate saving varies widely even across the advanced
economies, South Africa stands out in that households contribute merely a
quarter of total private saving – much less than anywhere else. While South
Africa’s corporate savings rate is among the highest in the sample, it is thus
the low household savings rate that brings South Africa’s private savings rate
down in comparison.
Per equation (2.2): β = s/gy, the saving and growth figures suggest
that South Africa’s wealth-income ratio is structurally lower than those of
the advanced economies because the country’s savings rate has been low
relative to its rate of income growth – regardless of whether the private or
household savings rate is considered. Especially when using total private
saving, however, the steady-state equation does not provide a satisfactory
explanation of the divergence between South Africa and the advanced
economies. Although all three countries had fairly similar savings and growth
rates, the wealth-income ratio decreased in South Africa, increased by 90
percentage points in the United States and increased by 220 percentage
points in the United Kingdom. This indicates that valuation effects played
a substantial role in the accumulation of wealth over the past four decades.
Finite horizon decomposition
Table 2.4 displays the results of the multiplicative decomposition proposed
by Piketty and Zucman (2014). In South Africa, national income grew at
gy = 2.5 percent per year between 1975 and 2010, while private wealth grew
at a rate of gw = 2.4 percent. The small discrepancy in the growth rates
of income and wealth explains the slight decline in the wealth-income ratio
from β1975 = 240 percent to β2010 = 231 percent.
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Plugging the average private savings rate of spriv = 7.7 into formula
(2.3’), we find that we would have predicted wealth to grow by gw,s = 4.1
percent per year in the absence of valuation effects, implying an increase
rather than a decrease in the wealth-income ratio. The fact that wealth grew
substantially less pronounced than suggested by the savings rate indicates
that valuation effects were negative, amounting to gw,r = −1.7 percent per
year. This finding contrasts starkly with the advanced economies: Only
Germany and Canada experienced slightly negative valuation effects between
1975 and 2010; in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States, in
contrast, asset price increases explained up to half of the total growth in
private wealth.
If only the household savings rate of shh = 2.2 is considered instead of
the total private savings rate, the saving-induced growth in wealth amounts
to only gw,s = 1.2 percent per year. In this case, the situation in South
Africa is more in line with the advanced economies, where the total valuation
effect explains up to three quarters of the increase in wealth. Figure 2.4
illustrates the bridge between the total revaluation effect from the household
perspective and the residual revaluation effect with corporate saving taken
into consideration.
The stark discrepancy between the ‘total’ and ‘residual’ revaluation
effect in South Africa is due to the disproportionate importance of corporate
saving relative to household saving. The specific composition of private
saving in the wealth accumulation equation also stands out in Figure 2.5,
which displays the results of equation (2.6). The low contribution of
household saving to the increase in private wealth is visible both in absolute
(top panel) and relative (bottom panel) terms. Conversely, the contribution
of corporate saving exceeds that of almost all other countries in both panels.
Savings, revaluations and the portfolio composition
The discrepancy between South Africa and the advanced economies is
likely also determined by differences in the asset composition. One of the
main contributors of the growth of private wealth observed for Piketty’s
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Table 2.3: Savings and growth rates, 1975–2010











South Africa 2.5 0.5 2.0 7.7 2.2 5.5
United States 2.8 1.8 1.0 8.0 4.7 3.3
Canada 2.6 1.5 1.1 12.5 7.4 5.1
Australia 3.1 1.7 1.3 9.2 5.3 3.9
Japan 2.3 1.9 0.4 16.1 7.2 8.9
Germany 2.2 1.4 0.8 12.8 9.8 3.0
France 2.0 1.5 0.5 11.4 9.2 2.2
United Kingdom 2.3 2.0 0.3 7.5 2.8 4.8
Italy 1.8 1.5 0.2 16.7 16.4 0.3
Note: Private savings rate (households and corporations, net of depreciation, in percent
of national income) and growth rate of real national income, 1975–2010, uniform-growth-
weighted averages, in percent. Data for advanced economies from Piketty and Zucman
(2014).
Figure 2.4: Decomposition of β, South Africa, 2014
Note: Decomposition of the South African private wealth-income ratio of 2014 on the
basis of 1975, in percent of national income.
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gy gw spriv gw,s gw,r
Decomposition using the private savings rate
South Africa 2.5 2.4 7.7 4.1 −1.7
United States 2.9 3.6 8.0 2.2 1.4
Australia 3.1 4.2 9.2 2.8 1.5
United Kingdom 2.3 4.0 7.5 2.0 2.0
Canada 2.6 4.2 12.5 4.3 −0.1
France 2.0 3.7 11.4 3.0 0.7
Japan 2.3 3.6 16.1 2.8 0.8
Germany 2.2 3.9 12.8 4.0 −0.2
Italy 1.8 4.0 16.7 3.8 0.2
Decomposition using the household savings rate
South Africa 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.2 1.2
United States 2.9 3.6 4.7 1.5 2.1
Australia 3.1 4.2 5.3 1.8 2.4
United Kingdom 2.3 4.0 2.8 0.9 3.0
Canada 2.6 4.2 7.4 2.8 1.3
France 2.0 3.7 9.2 2.5 1.2
Japan 2.3 3.6 7.2 1.4 2.2
Germany 2.2 3.9 9.8 3.2 0.7
Italy 1.8 4.0 16.4 3.8 0.2
Note: Decomposition of the drivers of the wealth-income ratio between 1975 and 2010;
multiplicative methodology (Piketty, 2014). βt and βt+n are given in percent of nominal
income, growth rates and savings rates in percent per year. Data for advanced economies
from Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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Figure 2.5: Decomposition of β, Cross Section, 2010
Note: Comparison of the drivers of the private wealth-income ratios of 2010 on the basis
of 1975, in percent of national income (top panel) and in percent of total (bottom panel).
Data for advanced economies from Piketty and Zucman (2014).
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rich countries was the prolonged increases in house prices over the last
four decades (Piketty, 2014, Rognlie, 2015). Rising house prices manifest
themselves in higher household saving (for instance, in the form of residential
mortgages) as well as in the form of real revaluations, the two components of
wealth accumulation that were much less pronounced in South Africa than
anywhere else.
In Section 2.3.2, we saw that housing assets are much less important than
financial assets in the composition of household portfolios, while equities play
a disproportionately larger role. Owing in part to the long history of controls
regarding capital and exchange outflows, the large majority of these equities
are likely tied to domestic companies.4 This suggests a reason why it is
corporate saving rather than household saving or revaluations that explain
the largest part of private wealth accumulation in South Africa.
2.4.2 Inter-temporal analysis
In a discussion of Piketty’s Capital, Acemoglu and Robinson (2015) stress
the importance of taking into account the institutions and politics prevalent
in specific countries at specific points in time. For South Africa, the
most important institutional and political shift over the period 1975–2014
is certainly the transition from the apartheid regime to a new democratic
government in 1992-1996.
As shown in Figure 2.2, these transition years are indeed those with
the lowest wealth-income ratios in the 40-year history: Between the mid-
1980s and the late 1990s, β decreased from 260 to 190 percent, as private
wealth grew significantly less than what would have been predicted from
the relatively high level of saving (see Table 2.5). The negative valuation
effects likely reflect the capital outflows and disinvestment associated with
the economic and political struggles during the final years of the apartheid
4Under the current prudential rules of the SARB the foreign exposure of pension funds
is restricted to 25 percent of retail assets; in the case of collective investment funds, long-
term insurance funds and other institutional investors, this share cannot exceed 35 percent
of assets under management; although an additional allowance in the order of five percent
of assets exists for African assets in both cases (see Section O - F.6 Capital transactions
in the Exchange Control Manual, available online from the SARB).
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government (which included the imposition of economic sanctions in 1986-
1991), as well as the political uncertainty over the transition of power and
the course of economic policy and property rights in the mid-1990s.
But private wealth recovered from the late 1990s onwards, as asset price
increases more than compensated for the falling savings rates. While South
Africa thus still does not look like the advanced economies today, it currently
seems to be on a trajectory to resemble them more closely.
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y gw spriv gw,s gw,r
Decomposition using the private savings rate
1975–1985 240 238 1.6 1.6 13.6 5.7 −4.1
1985–1995 238 216 1.6 0.6 10.5 4.6 −3.9
1995–2005 216 231 3.6 4.4 6.8 3.3 1.0
2005–2014 231 255 2.9 4.1 4.5 1.9 2.2
1975–2010 240 231 2.5 2.4 7.7 4.1 −1.7
1975–2014 240 255 2.4 2.6 7.5 3.9 −1.3
Decomposition using the household savings rate
1975–1985 240 238 1.6 1.6 5.3 2.2 −0.7
1985–1995 238 216 1.6 0.6 3.9 1.6 −1.0
1995–2005 216 231 3.6 4.4 1.4 0.7 3.7
2005–2014 231 255 2.9 4.1 −1.0 −0.5 4.6
1975–2010 240 231 2.5 2.4 2.2 1.2 1.2
1975–2014 240 255 2.4 2.6 1.7 1.0 1.6
Note: Decomposition of the drivers of the wealth-income ratio between 1975 and 2014.
Multiplicative methodology (Piketty, 2014). βt and βt+n are given in percent of nominal
income, growth rates and savings rates in percent per year.
58
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.5. WEALTH-INCOME RATIOS AND CAPITAL FLOWS
2.5 Wealth-income ratios and capital flows
In a closed economy, the wealth of a country’s (private) residents would
be equivalent to the domestic (private) capital stock, i.e., the capital stock
available for (private) production within the country’s boundaries. In South
Africa—as in all major advanced economies—however, wealth is relatively
mobile, with residents holding assets abroad and foreigners holding assets
in South Africa. This raises the question whether the low South African
wealth-income ratio can be explained by the fact that foreigners might own
a significant proportion of the South African capital stock.
Over the last 60 years, South Africa has indeed consistently had a
negative international investment position, meaning that the total value of
foreign liabilities exceeded the total value of foreign assets held by South
African residents abroad. However, the net debtor position is relatively
small nowadays, amounting to −14 percent of national income in 2014 (up
from −40 percent in the 1970s). It implies a private capital-income ratio
of βk = 269 percent (compared with the private wealth-income ratio of
β = 255 percent), which is still significantly lower than in the sample of
advanced economies (where the international investment position ranges from
approximately −70 to +70 percent).5
This is in contrast to the predictions of standard models in international
macroeconomics, according to which capital tends to flow from capital-
abundant rich countries to capital-scarcer poor countries, in which the
marginal productivity of capital and hence the returns on capital are higher.
The fact that international capital flows are insufficient to balance capital-
income ratios and returns to capital are, however, a well-documented puzzle
in economics (see Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, Lucas, 1990).
5Since I include housing capital in private capital for consistency with Piketty’s work,
“productive capital” includes includes capital used for the production of housing services.
In 2014, fixed capital of private enterprises amounted to 190 percent of national income.
Adding the fixed capital of households of 90 percent yields the private capital-income
ratio of approximately 270 percent. It is interesting to note that the increase in the
private wealth-income ratio since the late 1990s contrasts with a significant decline in the
fixed capital of private corporations over the same time period, 215 percent at the end of
the 1990s to 190 percent in 2014.
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2.6 Wealth-income ratios and inequality
The main reason for the growing interest in wealth-income ratios is
their potential distributional implications. As wealth gains importance
over incomes, wealth inequality—which typically exceeds income inequality
significantly—is likely to play an increasing role in shaping overall inequality
(Piketty and Zucman, 2014, 2015).
The traditional economic view on inequality and economic outcomes is
that of a “big trade-off” between equity and efficiency (Okun, 1975). In
this view, inequality is a symptom of a well-functioning market economy,
which provides incentives for investments, innovativeness and productive
work. Particularly in poor countries, income and wealth inequality can be a
sign that at least some people had (and will have) the opportunities to get
an education and invest in enterprises (Barro, 2000).
Over the last two decades, however, a growing number of empirical
studies suggested that high inequality could be associated with lower
growth rates and shorter growth spells than in more egalitarian societies
(Aghion et al., 1999, Berg and Ostry, 2011, Ostry et al., 2014). There is,
however, little evidence on the channels through which inequality impacts
economic growth and stability.
One channel through which inequality might impact the economy is
through investment in human and physical capital. While inequality can
indeed offer some people the incentives and opportunities to invest, it can
also deprive a large share of the population from such opportunities. In
the presence of credit constraints, poor households are not able to make
optimal investments in their education, health, or enterprises, thus reducing
the productive potential of the overall economy (Aghion et al., 1999, Barro,
2000). And even without credit constraints, poor households may not be
willing to make such investments in the presence of uninsurable or uninsured
risks (Collier and Gunning, 1999). This link is likely to be particularly
relevant in countries like South Africa, where high inequality is associated
with a higher poverty headcount than the aggregate middle-income status
would suggest (Van der Berg, 2010).
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Another channel through which income and wealth inequality could
impact the economy is through its social and political consequences. On
the one hand, poverty and inequality can encourage the poor to engage
in criminal and disruptive behaviour. This not only constitutes a direct
waste of resources that could be more productively used, but can also
increase political instability and discourage investment in the economy
(Alesina and Perotti, 1996, Barro, 2000). On the other hand, high inequality
can lead to suboptimal policy choices. In democratic societies, it can increase
the political pressure in favour of protectionist or redistributive policies,
which may not be optimal for economic growth or fiscal sustainability
(Alesina and Perotti, 1994, Meltzer and Richard, 1981, Ostry et al., 2014).
In less democratic societies, it can instead allow wealthy elites to gain a
disproportionate influence on political process, which might ultimately also
be harmful for sustainable economic growth (Deaton, 2013, Stiglitz, 2012).
A third channel that has been proposed to link inequality (particularly
wealth inequality) to adverse economic outcomes is that of domestic and
international financial markets. High inequality has been linked to higher
household debt and lower financial stability (Kumhof and Rancie`re, 2010,
Rajan, 2010), as well as to a greater vulnerability to external imbalances
(Kumhof et al., 2012).
For some of these channels, wealth inequality might be more relevant
than income inequality. The investment channel depends on the extent to
which credit constraints are binding, which is, in turn, a function of the
household’s balance sheet (the amount of savings or the value of assets for
down-payments and collateral). One of the political economy channels also
works through the wealth distribution, namely the distribution of assets
that can be used to gain political influence. For the third channel, the
role of wealth inequality is immediate: At any level of household assets
and debt, higher wealth inequality is associated with a higher headcount
of indebted households. To some extent, the scant evidence on the links
between inequality and economic performance could also be related to the
fact that most existing studies rely on measures for income inequality only.
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Better measures of wealth inequality can therefore help to better understand
why and how inequality affects the economy and society, and how inequality
can best be addressed.
2.6.1 From wealth-income ratios to the factor distribution
The relative importance of wealth and incomes does not, by itself, determine
which share of output goes to capital and labour. This is due to the
decreasing marginal productivity of capital: as the capital intensity of an
economy increases, the return on capital tends to decrease accordingly.
Under the assumption that all assets are real assets and that revaluation
effects wash out in the long run (such that real capital gains or losses on the
principal can be ignored), the private wealth-income ratio and the capital
share of output α can be related through the formula
α = r( β
(−)
)× β, (2.7)
where the rate of return on capital r is a decreasing function of the wealth-
income ratio β (Piketty, 2014). The distributional effect of an increase in
the wealth-income ratio thus depends on the responsiveness of the rate of
return, which in turn depends on the elasticity of substitution σ between
capital and labour in the aggregate production function. If σ < 1, capital
cannot effectively be substituted for labour (the two factors of production are
complements), such that the marginal productivity of additional capital falls
disproportionately. With σ > 1, additional capital can be employed more
productively, allowing its owners to capture a larger share of total output.
Only in the case that σ = 1 does an increase in the wealth-income ratio have
no impact on the factor distribution (Arrow et al., 1961, Bronfenbrenner,
1960, Piketty, 2014).6
6While the explanation for the responsiveness of r to changes in β assumes that capital
is remunerated according to its marginal productivity, the same result can be obtained
in models in which the remuneration of capital is instead determined by the bargaining
power of capital owners relative to workers.
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Most economic models assume a unitary elasticity of substitution; many
empirical papers even suggest that the elasticity is lower (Rognlie, 2015). In
Capital, Piketty contests both views by observing that capital shares across
countries followed a similar—albeit less pronounced—trend as the wealth-
income ratio, which indicates that the returns on capital have not fallen
as much as the increase in capital intensity would have suggested. Since
1970, capital owners in the major advanced economies have thus been able
to expand their incomes (net of depreciation) from 15–25 to 25–30 percent
of total output. For Piketty, this points to an increasingly high elasticity of
substitution.7
One reason for the disagreement on the elasticity of substitution between
capital and labour and the factor shares of income is that these concepts are
hard to measure. The most common methodology to measure the latter
is to calculate the labour share by dividing the aggregate compensation of
employees through GDP at factor cost, and to derive the capital share as
the residual (Gollin, 2002). The SARB provides such estimates for South
Africa, which put the gross capital share just below 50 percent. Netting out
depreciation yields a net capital share just below 40 percent – significantly
higher than the 25–30 percent reported in Piketty’s sample of advanced
economies.8
7Piketty’s view has been supported by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014), who
estimate that σ = 1.25. It has been contested by Rognlie (2015), who argues that the
increase in the capital share was driven primarily by housing capital, and thus allows
no inference on the shape of the aggregate production function. Instead of being a
consequence of a high elasticity of substitution, the parallel increase in α and β were
driven by a third factor, notably the increase in house prices.
8In the presence of a substantial informal sector, the methodology of dividing the
aggregate compensation of employees through GDP tends to understate the labour share,
since incomes of those not formally employed in the corporate sector are included in
the denominator but not the numerator (Gollin, 2002). An alternative methodology is
to divide the corporate compensation of employees through corporate value added only
(Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). For South Africa, the corporate sector shares are
very similar to the total economy estimates, indicating that there is no major distortion.
Using SARB data, the corporate and total capital shares for 2010 are 51 and 50 percent; in
Karabarbounis and Neiman’ database they are 48 and 46 percent. To obtain net shares,
depreciation is subtracted from the denominator (Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014).
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Combined with the relatively low wealth-income ratio, the high capital
share points to a disproportionately high return on capital in South Africa.
Per Equation 2.7, the implied average annual pre-tax return on private capital
has been 15 percent on average in real terms over the last four decades –
significantly higher than the 4-8 percent Piketty and Zucman estimate for
the eight advanced economies, and also significantly higher than the real
rate of income growth of two percent per year on average.9
Figure 2.6 shows α, β and r since 1975. As in the case of Piketty’s
sample, the capital share increased over the last decades. Yet unlike in
Piketty’s sample of advanced economies, this increase did not correlate with
an increase in the wealth-income ratio. If anything, α and β seem to have
moved inversely. The capital share of output grew substantially while the
wealth-income ratio decreased in the 1980s and 1990s, peaking shortly after
β reached its low. Conversely, the recent increase in the wealth-income ratio
was not accompanied by a further expansion of the capital share, but rather
by a small contraction. While it would be imprudent to conclude from this
alone that σ < 1 in South Africa, these series do suggest that an increase
in the wealth-income ratio does not automatically increase capital’s share in
the factor distribution. An elasticity of substitution less than unity is also
consistent with the industry-level work of Kreuser et al. (2015), who estimate
the elasticity of substitution for South Africa between 0.6 and 0.9.
9Based on Piketty and Zucman (2014), I derive r as follows: The net capital share α
is defined as the ratio between capital incomes and net domestic product at factor cost,
α ≡ YK/(NDP −T ), where T denotes production taxes. β is defined as the ratio between
private wealth and national income, β ≡W/Y . With r defined as the ratio between capital
incomes and private wealth, we can write r ≡ YK/W = α/β × (NDP − T )/Y , where all
figures are net of depreciation. For South Africa, the results for the period spanning
1975–2014 are α = 37 percent, β = 228 percent, (NDP − T )/Y = 92 percent, yielding
r = 15 percent on average. Note that Piketty and Zucman (2014) do not multiply α/β by
(NDP − T )/Y . Note also that the rate of return is derived under the assumption that
all assets are real assets and that valuation effects even out in the long run. For Piketty,
these assumptions provide a reasonably good approximation, as real assets constitute the
majority of household assets in the advanced economies. For us, however, the calculated
return might be overstated, as about 30 percent of assets are nominal (while the inflation
rate averaged 10 percent).
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Figure 2.6: Capital-income ratios, capital shares and returns




1975–2014, in percent. Minimum and maximum marked.
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2.6.2 From wealth-income ratios to the structure of inequality
Since wealth (and therefore capital incomes) tends to be more concentrated
than labour incomes, a high capital share tends to be associated with higher
overall inequality (Piketty and Zucman, 2014).
While there is little reliable data on the distribution of wealth in South
Africa, it is likely that the degree of wealth inequality is extreme in a country
that consistently ranks among the world’s most unequal economies with
regard to incomes. According to Daniels et al. (2014), 10 percent of South
African households earn half of all incomes but own 80–90 percent of all
wealth. The equivalent numbers for the OECD are ‘only’ about 30 and 50
percent (OECD, 2015). Even within the wealthiest decile, the distribution
tends to be highly uneven. Data from the Forbes billionaires list suggest
that the wealthiest 10 individuals owned about four percent of the country’s
private wealth in 2015, while the market research company New World
Wealth estimates that 46,800 individuals owned assets that together amount
to over a quarter of the combined wealth of all 54 million South Africans.10
Together with the high capital share, these figures suggest that wealth
inequality should play an important role in shaping overall inequality
in South Africa. This contrasts with the emphasis that South African
researchers and policymakers currently place on labour market inequality:
According to Van der Berg (2010) and Leibbrandt et al. (2010), for instance,
wage inequality explains up to 80–85 percent of overall income inequality.
One potential explanation is that wealth is too concentrated to shape the
distribution anywhere but at the very top: Most South Africans have
no income-generating assets at all, such that their position in the income
distribution is determined by their wages alone.11 Chapter 3 of this thesis
will follow this line of thought.
10Data available from Forbes (www.forbes.com/africa-billionaires/list/) and the
New World Wealth South Africa Wealth Report 2015 description (www.nw-wealth.com)
(full report not accessed).
11Note that the findings of Leibbrandt et al. are based on the National Income Dynamics
Survey, which—being a survey with focus on incomes, expenditures, living conditions
and poverty—tends to under-sample the wealthiest households and under-report assets
(particularly pension assets). It might therefore understate the importance of capital
66
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.7. CONCLUSION
2.7 Conclusion
The intention of this chapter was to test the applicability of Piketty’s work
in the context of a developing country. By describing and analysing the
discrepancy in the private wealth-income ratio between South Africa and
the advanced economies, it made one step towards this objective. Unlike
the rich countries, South Africa did not experience a prolonged increase in
private wealth; a trend that reflects structural differences between developing
and advanced economies (lower savings and higher growth rates) as well as
specific factors surrounding South Africa’s political transition in the 1980s
and 1990s. Even in South Africa, however, wealth has grown much more
quickly than incomes over the last 15 years. This raises the question to what
extent South Africa might be starting to share more of the structural and
behavioural characteristics with some of the major advanced economies.
It is important to note that this chapter did not replicate all aspects of
Piketty’s research. First, it focused on private wealth only, as the sectoral
balance sheets for the public sector are still under construction. Once these
data become available, they will allow comparing national rather than private
wealth- and capital-income ratios, a concept of greater relevance from the
perspective of economic growth. Second, and perhaps more importantly,
this chapter does not allow for drawing conclusions about the distribution
of wealth on the personal level. The analyses presented in this chapter
showed that capital receives a much higher share of income in South Africa
than in other countries, which points to a disproportionately high return on
private wealth. If the following chapter confirms the suspicion that capital
incomes are more concentrated than labour incomes, this would imply that
the distributional concerns raised by Piketty’s observations could be shared in
South Africa even though the overall wealth-income ratio is still substantially
lower.
incomes significantly. In the advanced economies, the labour share in inequality is between
two thirds and three quarters (Piketty and Zucman, 2015).
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Chapter 3
Wealth inequality in South
Africa: Insights from survey
and tax data
This chapter assesses two sources of information on the South African wealth
distribution: a large-scale household survey with 18,820 respondents in 2010–2011,
and a novel sample of almost 1.2 million personal income tax records for the 2010–
2011 tax year. Since both sources cover different sub-populations, I propose an
approach to scale the results by fitting and drawing from censored distributions.
Despite the differences in the coverage of each dataset, I find that both sources
yield similar results for overall inequality once appropriate censoring rules and
parametrizations are defined. In particular, I find robust evidence that wealth is
much more unequally distributed than income: 10 percent of the population own
at least 90–95 percent of all private wealth, compared to roughly 45 percent of all
labour income. With a Gini coefficient of about 0.95 (compared to 0.60 for labour
income), the South African wealth distribution is as unequal as that of the world
as a whole.
Keywords: Income and wealth distribution; inequality; survey and tax data
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3.1 Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis, the Great Recession and the increase in
economic inequality have brought considerable attention to the issues of
wealth distribution and redistribution (see, e.g. Piketty, 2014; IMF 2014;
OECD, 2015). In many countries, however, the debates are ahead of the
evidence. One such country is South Africa.
Despite the concern about the persisting economic disparities since the
end of apartheid, existing research has focused almost exclusively on income
inequality (see, e.g., Alvaredo and Atkinson, 2010, Leibbrandt et al., 2010,
Van der Berg, 2010).1 Even though South Africa was one of the first countries
to publish a large-scale wealth survey in 2012, this data was given much
less attention than the income data collected in the same survey.2 This is
particularly surprising given that capital receives almost 40 percent of total
output in South Africa, suggesting that wealth inequality plays an important
role in shaping overall inequality (see Chapter 2).
Without trusted domestic data, recent proposals on tax reform have
been based on findings from other countries, primarily Thomas Piketty’s
work on the major advanced economies (Davis Tax Committee, 2015). In
this chapter I re-evaluate the available survey data by combining it with
novel tax records and the official household sector balance sheets. I not only
want to shed more light on the distribution of income and wealth in South
Africa, but also seek to propose a way in which researchers can integrate
multiple data sources to study inequality even in countries in which each
individual source is subject to various biases and inaccuracies.
The survey data presented in this chapter stem from the second wave
of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), which was conducted in
1The two early exceptions are McGrath’s (1982) analysis of the wealth distribution in
the Natal Province of the 1970s and van Heerden’s (1997) thesis on the wealth distribution
of the Transvaal in 1985. Both studies use the estate multiplier method to estimate the
wealth distribution from estate accounts, and focus on the extreme inequality between
racial groups during the apartheid system.
2Daniels et al.’s (2014) analysis of the quality of the wealth data in the second wave of
the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) constitutes the only exception. The fourth
wave of the NIDS, published in June 2016, also contains a wealth module.
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2010–2011 and included a special module on wealth. Surveys are a common
source of information on personal wealth, but tend to understate both assets
and liabilities due to the social sensitivity and cognitive complexity of the
topic. Since rich households are often found to have the lowest response
rates, surveys are particularly prone to understating the wealth at the top
of the distribution (ECB2013a; Daniels et al., 2014, Vermeulen, 2014). And
since the NIDS was not specifically designed as a wealth survey when it was
launched in 2008, it is exceedingly unlikely that its sample includes any of
the few high net worth individuals that typically capture a significant share
of private wealth.
Tax filing is mandatory for people with incomes above certain thresholds,
such that personal tax records are not subject to the same biases as voluntary
surveys. In South Africa, however, wealth itself is not liable to taxation, such
that taxable investment income must hold as a proxy for wealth. In this
chapter I use a previously unpublished dataset of almost 1.2 million personal
income tax (PIT) records for the 2010–2011 tax year. Although the PIT
dataset should provide better information on the top of the distribution than
the NIDS, the data have other limitations. First, the PIT dataset provides
no information on forms of wealth that do not generate taxable investment
income to the tax filer, such as owner-occupied housing, pension assets or
assets held in trusts. Second, the PIT dataset excludes all individuals whose
incomes are below the filing thresholds. While non-filers are not of much
concern to researchers in advanced economies, they constitute the majority
of the population in developing countries. Less than 20 percent of the South
African adult population are liable to file income tax returns, and less than
a tenth of these filers—about one percent of the total adult population—
declared any investment income at all.
To compare the information from both data sources I treat the PIT
dataset as a proxy for the wealth of the tax-filing top tail of the distribution,
and “scale” the results by simulating the wealth of non-filers from a
bottom-censored lognormal distribution.3 I also test the NIDS for potential
3Researchers in other countries have estimated the underlying asset holdings by
capitalising investment incomes using average investment returns for each asset class
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misreporting of top wealth by dropping and re-drawing the richest one
percent from a top-censored Pareto distribution. This approach is validated
by the finding that the resulting measures of income inequality coincide
closely between the two sources: according to the NIDS, one percent of the
employed population earns 11 of all labour income whilst ten percent earn
46 percent; in the PIT dataset, the equivalent figures are 12 and 43 percent.
With regards to wealth inequality, the results coincide less neatly. Tail
wealth remains particularly hard to pinpoint, with top one percent shares
ranging from 60 percent in the NIDS to almost 90 percent in the PIT
dataset, where important forms of middle-class wealth (such as housing and
pensions) are excluded. Nevertheless, both sources agree that ten percent of
the population own 90–95 percent of all wealth.
Since neither the NIDS nor the PIT dataset reflects the asset
composition in the national accounts, I also combine the estimates using the
PIT dataset to measure the concentration of financial assets, the NIDS to
measure the concentration of non-financial assets, and the national accounts
to define appropriate weights. The resulting top wealth shares of 67 percent
for the top centile and 93 percent for the top decile should provide the most
reliable first estimates for wealth inequality in South Africa. With a combined
Gini coefficient of 0.95 (compared to 0.60 for labour income), they suggest
that the country itself is as unequal as the world at large.
Age and race can play a role in explaining the high degree of wealth
inequality in South Africa. Younger people have had less time to accumulate
savings than older ones; black citizens were denied access to most forms of
capital during the apartheid system (see, e.g., McGrath, 1982).4 Yet, neither
of these factors is found to contribute more than five percent to total wealth
inequality. While the age-wealth profiles lend some support for the life-cycle
hypothesis among middle class households, inequality within generations
(Saez and Zucman, 2014, Wolff, 1987). Given the low granularity of the PIT records
(split into interest income and other investment income only) and given the additional
sensitivity that would be introduced by making assumptions on the returns of the other
financial assets category, I use investment income directly. This equates to the assumption
that all asset classes generate the same average returns.
4In this thesis, ”black” refers to all South African citizens not of European descent.
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remains much more important than inter-generational inequality. And while
black households are still much poorer on average than white households,
it stands out that the inequality within the African majority population
far exceeds the inequality of all other groups. Paradoxical as it sounds,
the presence of (disproportionately wealthy) white households lowers overall
wealth inequality in South Africa. This finding supports existing research on
income, according to which South Africas highly unequal income distribution
is increasingly shaped by growing within-group inequality (Leibbrandt et al.,
2010).
To my knowledge, this is the first study that systematically examines
private wealth, its distribution and composition in South Africa. It
draws on a growing literature on wealth inequality using household wealth
surveys (e.g., ECB 2013a,b; Vermeulen 2014) and income tax records
(e.g., Bricker et al., 2016, Saez and Zucman, 2014), and extends it to a
context in which both surveys and tax records are less reliable. My
initial hypothesis was that an integrated view of the two sources would
be necessary in a country in which each individual data source is highly
incomplete and inaccurate. I was thus surprised to find that the two data
sets led to surprisingly similar conclusions on the overall income and wealth
distribution (outside the top one percent). Although this chapter suggests
that more accurate data is necessary for designing concrete policies on wealth
redistribution, it should provide some encouragement to practitioners who
wish to study the degree of inequality in countries with even scarcer data
than South Africa.
3.2 Household wealth: The aggregate view
Although this chapter is primarily concerned with the distribution of wealth
between households, aggregate household sector balance sheets are relevant
to contextualize and compare the household-level data. This section briefly
recaps the main results from Chapter 2 on the size and composition of wealth
in South Africa.
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The concept and measure of wealth in this chapter follows directly from
the household sector balance sheets in the South African national accounts.
Based on the work of Aron and Muellbauer (2006) and Aron et al. (2008)
the definition is consistent with those in the major advanced economies.
Wealth is calculated as the residual between the market value of all assets
and liabilities – a quantity also known as “net worth”. Assets include
financial assets (such as cash, stocks, bonds, unit trusts, pension and long-
term insurance assets) and non-financial assets (real estate, land and other
fixed assets), but exclude durable consumer goods (such as cars). Although
the combined assets of the household sector typically exceed its liabilities on
the aggregate level, the net worth of individual households can therefore also
be negative.
At 255 percent of national income, private wealth plays a much smaller
role in South Africa than in the major advanced economies (where it ranged
from 400 to 700 percent in 2010; see Piketty, 2014). Two thirds of this wealth
is in the form of financial assets, with pension and life-insurance assets being
the single most important form of private wealth (36 percent of total assets
in 2010).
Despite the relatively low level of private wealth, capital receives an
even larger share of output in South Africa than elsewhere. The net capital
share of output is just below 40 percent – significantly higher than the 25–30
percent reported in Piketty’s sample of advanced economies. In combination,
these figures point to a disproportionately high return on capital in South
Africa (Piketty, 2014).
A high capital share of total output means that wealth inequality plays
an important role in determining the structure of overall inequality: almost
40 percent of total income accrues to capital owners, which tend to form a
much smaller group than the recipients of labour income. To what extent the
factor distribution shapes the overall personal income distribution depends
on the size of this group as well as on the concentration of investment income
and wealth relative to labour income and employment. The remainder of this
chapter will attempt to address this question.
74
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.3. WEALTH DISTRIBUTION: DATA SOURCES
3.3 Wealth distribution: Data sources
There are two main sources for microeconomic data on wealth: large-
scale household surveys and administrative records from tax authorities.
The main advantage of surveys is that they allow researchers to pose a
large number of questions to a large number of people. The second wave
of the biannual National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS)—conducted by
the Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU) in
2010–2011—included a special module on wealth, and asked almost 9,000
households with 24,000 adult members about the value of all their assets and
debts. The main disadvantage is related to the sample selection: given that
wealth tends to be highly concentrated among a small number of high net
worth individuals, a random sample is very unlikely to include any one of
these households. Another disadvantage of surveys is that the participation
is voluntary: surveyed households can refuse to answer certain questions
or decline participation altogether. In the case that the willingness to
participate differs between poorer and richer people, this introduces a bias in
the survey results (Ravallion, 2003, Vermeulen, 2014, Wolff, 1987). Thirdly,
the accuracy of wealth survey data also suffers from the social sensitivity
and cognitive complexity of the topic, which tends to lead people across the
distribution to understate the value of their assets vis-a`-vis the interviewer
(ECB 2013a; Daniels et al. 2014).
Since taxation is mandatory for people with income above certain
thresholds, tax records can provide better information on the top of the
wealth distribution. In South Africa, however, wealth itself is not liable to
taxation, such that taxable investment income must hold as a proxy. For
this study, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) provided a previously
unpublished 20 percent sample of the 2010–2011 personal income tax (PIT)
assessment, which consists of almost 1.2 million individual records.5 Since
not all assets produce income streams and since not all income streams can be
5The 2011 assessment covers the tax year from March 2010 to February 2011. SARS
also provided a 20% sample of the 2014 assessment for the 2013–2014 tax year, which is
briefly discussed in Appendix C.4.
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tracked at the level of the individual, however, the wealth coverage of the PIT
dataset is much narrower than can be achieved by household surveys.6 The
following sections discuss the South African survey and tax data in greater
detail.
3.3.1 Wealth concepts in the NIDS and the PIT dataset
What is included in the NIDS?
In theory, the wealth concept of the NIDS is closely comparable to the
national accounts. A household questionnaire asks the oldest woman or other
knowledgeable adult in the household about the value of the household’s
non-financial assets and mortgages, while an adult questionnaire asks each
household member about their financial and business assets and liabilities.7
Both questionnaires also contain a “one-shot” question on wealth. This
question asks whether the respondent would be in debt, break even or have
something left over if they would sell all assets and repay all debts, and asks
them to quantify this amount. From these four sources one can (in theory)
construct comprehensive estimates of household and individual wealth.
To generate such a wealth variable, I first aggregate all asset-level data
from the adult and household questionnaires into pension and life-insurance
assets, other financial assets/liabilities, business assets/liabilities, real estate
assets/liabilities, and livestock assets. I do not impute missing values, unless
the answer is given in preceding or subsequent questions. I then aggregate
the individual-level assets and liabilities across household members to arrive
at the bottom-up estimate for household-level wealth. Analogous to this,
6A third type of data, also administrative, comes from estate tax records. When
combined with mortality tables, these can be used to estimate the underlying wealth
distribution (Piketty and Saez, 2006, Wolff, 1987). The first analyses on the South African
wealth distribution were based on estate tax records from Natal (McGrath, 1982).
7Non-financial assets include real estate, land and livestock; financial assets include
cash, banking assets, stocks, bonds, unit trusts, life insurance and pension assets; liabilities
include mortgages, bank and non-bank loans, credit card and store card debt as well as
outstanding hire purchase agreements. Appendix B.1 provides details on the NIDS wealth
data.
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I break down household-level assets and liabilities to arrive at individual
wealth estimates.8
In certain cases, the answer to the one-shot wealth question might
provide a more reliable indicator than the bottom-up estimates. I substitute
valid, non-zero one-shot results for the bottom-up estimate if these estimates
are missing or zero. I also substitute one-shot results in cases in which these
exceed the bottom-up estimate in absolute terms due to item non responses
on the category level (i.e., the household does not have valid responses for
all classes of assets and liabilities), or due to unit non-responses within
households.9
If all questions are answered accurately, this procedure should provide
a comprehensive estimate of private wealth. In practice, however, it is
unlikely that survey respondents disclose their entire wealth. Although half
of all formal-sector employees are covered by occupational pension schemes,
for instance (National Treasury, 2012), only five percent of adults reported
owning a pension or retirement annuity, and only a third of these were
able or willing to provide a quantification. While pension and long-term
insurance assets thus constitute more than 30 percent of assets in the national
accounts, they only account for 10 percent of assets in the NIDS. For non-
pension financial assets, the under-statement is even more pronounced.10 If
financial assets are more concentrated than non-financial assets (see, e.g.
ECB, 2013b; OECD, 2015, Saez and Zucman, 2014), the under-statement of
8Real estate and livestock are measured on the household level. For real estate, the
NIDS asks to specify up to three home owners. Where available, I use this information
to allocate real estate assets and mortgages to household members; otherwise, I allocate
these items evenly to all adult household members. For livestock, the NIDS provides no
information on ownership, so I allocate livestock assets evenly to all members.
9Appendix B.1 and B.2.2 provide detail on the treatment of missing values and the
construction of our wealth aggregates.
10Note that the national accounts and the NIDS are not perfectly comparable: The
national accounts include non-profit institutions in the household sector, while the NIDS
does not survey such institutions. National accounts and surveys also differ in the
treatment of business assets and the coverage of land (ECB 2013b). However, the
discrepancies seem too large to be explained by conceptual differences. See Appendix
B.5 for a Table with the portfolio composition, and Appendix B.6 for a detailed discussion
of pension wealth in the NIDS.
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financial wealth is likely to introduce a downward-bias to our estimates on
wealth inequality.11
What is included in the PIT dataset?
Whereas the concept of wealth in the NIDS is at least theoretically
comprehensive, the coverage of the PIT dataset is from the outset limited to
those assets that generate taxable incomes in the name of the individual tax
filer (see also Table 3.1). It therefore provides no information whatsoever
on assets that do not generate investment incomes (such as owner-occupied
housing or livestock), assets whose incomes are exempt from taxation, or
assets whose incomes accrue to a different entity (such as in the case of
pension funds or trusts).
In countries with more comprehensive (or better integrated) wealth-
related tax systems, researchers usually estimate underlying asset
holdings before analyzing the wealth distribution (Bricker et al., 2016,
Saez and Zucman, 2014, Wolff, 1987). This capitalization technique makes
assumptions on the average investment returns for each asset class, and
uses these returns to convert flows into stocks. Given the low granularity
of the PIT records provided by SARS (split into interest income and
other investment income only in order to protect anonymity) and given
the additional sensitivity that would be introduced by making assumptions
on the average return of the other financial assets category, the analyses
presented in this chapter are based on investment income directly. Compared
to the income capitalization methodology, this simplification equates to the
assumption that all asset classes generate the same average returns.
The following provides an overview about all forms of wealth that are
missing in the PIT dataset:
11Financial assets have also been found to be understated in other countries (see,
for example, Andreasch and Lindner, 2014, Sierminska et al., 2008). Apart from general
under-reporting, the high concentration of financial assets among very wealthy households
(who tend to be under-represented in surveys) can also play a role in explaining the
discrepancy.
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Tax exemptions: Local interest up to R22,300 is exempt from taxation,
and local dividends are liable to the dividend withholding tax rather than
the PIT. While these incomes are reported for informational purposes in the
PIT files, they are not verified by the tax authorities. If recipients of interest
incomes below the tax threshold don’t bother to report their earnings, this
could lead us to overstate the degree of inequality.12
Owner-occupied housing: For most lower and middle income households,
their homes constitute a large share of their wealth. Since owner-occupied
houses do not generate income, these assets are not reflected in the PIT
dataset – an omission that is likely to further overstate the degree of
inequality, and that we cannot correct for with the available data.
Pension assets: Interests in pension funds and long-term insurers are an
even more important asset class for South African households than housing.
However, pension and insurance assets are only taxable through the PIT
when paid out to the beneficiary (as an annuity or lump-sum withdrawal),
which would lead us to overstate inequality significantly. I propose to impute
the value of pension assets from current pension and retirement annuity
contributions, which are reported as deductions in the PIT. However, the
lack of information on individual contribution periods and pre-retirement
withdrawals limits the accuracy of this correction and likely leads us to
understate the degree of inequality.13
Private trusts: While the investment incomes of trusts are liable to
taxation, the PIT dataset does not link the tax files of private trusts to
individual beneficiaries. Since private trusts are widely used among wealthy
South Africans, their omission is likely to understate the degree of inequality
further.
Business assets: Although the PIT system includes profits of
unincorporated businesses, these are likely to include a significant labour
component. Since the estimation on the basis of investment returns is highly
12I impute non-reported interest income based on draws from a fitted distribution, which
should provide a lower bound for the inequality of local interest income. See Section 3.3.3
for details on the imputation of interest income under the filing threshold.
13See Appendix C.2 for details on the imputation of pension assets.
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sensitive (R100,000 in entrepreneurial income would be interpreted as one
million Rand worth of business assets under a rate of return of 10 percent),
I decide to exclude business profits from our measure of investment income.
Since real business assets are among the most highly concentrated forms
of wealth, this exclusion will further contribute to understate the degree of
inequality.
Capital gains: In addition to regular income streams, many assets
generate capital gains or losses when the current value differs from the
purchase price. However, these paper gains or losses only become liable
to PIT filing when they are sold, donated, bequeathed or otherwise disposed
of. If the data spanned several decades, the distribution of reported capital
gains and losses could provide very valuable insight on the underlying
wealth distribution. Due to the irregularity of asset disposals, however,
the inclusion of realised capital gains and losses in a cross-sectional study
would bias our findings. I therefore exclude capital gains and losses from
the investment income data, despite the fact that this also contributes to
understate inequality.14
Tax evasion: Although PIT filings are verified in tax inspections, it is
likely that a non-negligible portion of investment income bypasses the tax
system due to tax evasion – particularly through offshore assets. As with
private trusts, offshore portfolios are more common among the wealthy, thus
constituting another omission that biases our estimates downwards.
Liabilities: The PIT dataset provides no information on liabilities. This
could lead us to either over- or understate the degree of inequality: On
the one hand, we implicitly treat indebted people as if they had zero or even
positive wealth; on the other, we also overstate the wealth of highly leveraged
14While I exclude local capital gains, I cannot exclude foreign capital gains since
these series were not provided for confidentiality reasons. Foreign capital gains
are relatively small – in 2011, 2,024 individuals reported foreign capital gains of
R73,361 on average (compared to 54,050 individuals reporting local capital gains of
R105,730 and 190,318 individuals reporting an average interest income of R55,537)
(South African Revenue Service, 2012). Nevertheless, the failure to exclude individuals
with high foreign once-off capital gains is likely to increase measured inequality
significantly.
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investors. Since assets are distributed very similarly to wealth in the NIDS,
this indicates that the bias should only be moderate.
Whether our estimates of wealth inequality from taxable investment
income are over- or understated (relative to the NIDS and relative to the true
level of inequality) will depend on the relative magnitude of the individual
biases.
3.3.2 Coverage of the NIDS and the PIT dataset
Who is included in the NIDS?
One of the main advantages of the NIDS dataset is its scope. As one of
South Africa’s largest household surveys, it covers roughly 8,986 households
with 23,846 adult members. Despite a relatively high non-response rate on
wealth-related questions, it still contains 18,820 observations on wealth per
person – thus covering a larger share of the population than some of the
American and European wealth surveys.
Despite the comparably large size of the NIDS, the survey is unlikely to
provide an unbiased representation of the South African wealth distribution.
It is commonly found that higher-income households are less likely to be
successfully interviewed in surveys (Ravallion, 2003, Vermeulen, 2014, Wolff,
1987). SALDRU provides two sets of weights to correct for systematic
differences in the probability that a household is interviewed in the initial
and subsequent waves of the survey, as well as to calibrate the dataset
to national, provincial and sex-race-age group population totals.15 While
these weights help to correct for the under-representation of middle-class
households relative to poorer ones, they cannot correct for the fact that a
survey with roughly 9,000 households is exceedingly unlikely to include one
of the few thousand ultra-high-net worth households that tend to control a
significant proportion of wealth in any country. Of the 10 South Africans on
the African Forbes ranking, the poorest had a net worth of more than R3
15I use SALDRU’s post-stratified weights in all analyses of the NIDS. Using these
weights, I do not find that item non-response rates differ systematically between income
deciles. See Appendix B.2.1 and B.2.2 for details on sampling and response biases.
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Table 3.1: PIT – Measure of “wealth”







35 Various Medium Partly†
Other financial assets
Cash equivalents 11 Interest Medium Yes‡
Other securities∗ 22 Interest and
dividends
High Yes‡
Real estate assets 26
Owner-occupied Implied rent Low No









Liabilities 20 Interest Low No
Note: Portfolio composition in the national accounts and coverage in the PIT dataset. The
distribution of total assets is estimated from the balance sheets for households and financial
institutions. The degree of concentration is based on Piketty (2014) and Saez and Zucman
(2014). ∗Other securities includes government securities, stocks, debentures, preference
shares and ordinary shares. †Current contributions to pension and retirement annuity
funds only. ‡Local interest below the threshold of R22,300 and local dividend income in
its entirety is exempt from the PIT, and the accuracy of exempt income is not verified in
the tax inspection process.
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billion (US$400 million). With a net worth of “only” R300 million, the richest
person in the NIDS is thus well below this cut-off of the ultra-wealthy.16
Who is included in the PIT dataset?
South African residents are liable to file income taxes as soon as their income
exceeds a certain filing threshold. In 2011, 5.9 million individuals filed their
tax returns; about 17 percent of the adult population of 34.5 million.17 Filing
thresholds imply that our data is censored for the bottom 83 percent of the
distribution: We have no other information on the incomes of the non-filing
majority than that their labour income must have been less than R120,000
and their local interest income below R22,300 in 2010.
In addition to being bottom-censored, the PIT dataset is effectively top-
coded for individuals with taxable incomes above R10 million (602 individuals
in 2010–11, or 120 individuals in the 20 percent sample). For confidentiality
reasons, SARS provides only aggregate statistics for this group of people.18
Even with top-coding, the richest person in the PIT dataset reports an
interest income of R22 million – in line with assets of R2–4 billion at a
rate of return of 5–10 percent and a 20 percent share of interest-bearing
16If there are 30 Rand billionaires in South Africa, a simple random sample would have
to include at least 1.8 million people in order to include at least one of them with 80 percent
probability (hypergeometric distribution: 0.8 = 1 − P (X = k) = 1 − (Kk )(N−Kn−k )(Nn)−1,
where K = 30, k = 0, N = 34, 500, 000, and n = 1, 800, 000 is solved for iteratively).
17For labour income, the 2011 threshold is R120,000 (one employer) or R60,000 (more
than one employer). With regards to investment income, the filing threshold is R22,300
for local interest and R3,700 for foreign interest or dividends – an amount consistent with
financial assets of more than R300,000 at 2010 deposit interest rates of 6–8 percent (see
Appendix C.1). The exception to this overlap are non-compliant high-income individuals
(who do not file tax returns for the purpose of tax evasion) and low-income individuals
who do file tax returns in order to claim deductions. Voluntary filing is common: In the
2011 assessment sample, 25 percent of filers have a labour income below R60,000 and 50
percent below R120,000, and 98 percent of filers have an interest income below the filing
threshold of R22,300.
18While this top-coding does not bias our results on top wealth shares for the larger
population, it does introduce a minor downward bias to some distributional metrics (such
as Gini coefficients). It has been proposed to correct for right-censoring by simulating
the topcoded values from a censored distribution (see e.g. Jenkins et al., 2011). Given
the small number of top-coded observations (120 individuals in a sample of almost 1.2
million) and the complications arising from top-coding on the basis of a third variable
(taxable income), I proceed with the imputation of averages.
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assets. Although the Forbes rankings report even wealthier South Africans,
this suggests that the coverage of the top tail is indeed much better in the
PIT dataset than in the survey data.
3.3.3 Scaling and resampling
Scaling the bottom tail of the PIT
Since the PIT only includes the sub-population of tax filers, we have to make
assumptions on the incomes of non-filers before calculating distributional
metrics for the overall population. A standard assumption on the shape
of the income distribution is a leptokurtic lognormal distribution: While
the thick upper tail of the income distribution is described through a power
law, the majority of incomes follow a lognormal distribution (Battistin et al.,
2009, Lydall, 1976, Montroll and Shlesinger, 1982, Pareto, 1897). To “scale”
the distributional estimates from the 5.9 million tax filers to the total adult
population of 34.5 million, I simulate the incomes of non-filers by fitting a
censored lognormal distribution to the data.
I first add 5.7 million observations (5.7 = 0.2 × (34.5 − 5.9)) to the
dataset, and set their incomes equal to the filing thresholds. I take logarithms
and use a Tobit model to estimate the mean µˆ and variance σˆ2 of the
censored distribution. I then impute the missing data as random draws from
a normal distribution ln(y∗) ∼ N(µˆ, σˆ), conditional on the data being below
the threshold b. The conditional mean and variance for bottom-censored
observations are derived as
E(y|y ≤ b) = µˆ− σˆ φ(β)
Φ(β)
(3.1)









where b is the lower censoring value, µˆ and σˆ the estimated mean and
standard deviation of the censored distribution, φ the standard normal
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Even among filers, individual data points might be censored because of
tax exemptions on investment income. A person with a labour income of
R200,000 and an interest income of R10,000 is liable to file taxes because he
or she exceeds the filing threshold on employment incomes, but might decide
to omit his or her interest income as it is irrelevant to the bottom line.
Applying the scaling approach to these non-reporters (zero entries among
filers) should correct for any such bias.
Resampling the top tail of the NIDS
While the PIT excludes the bottom 83 percent of the population, the NIDS
runs the risk of under-representing the very top. While there are some very
wealthy individuals in the NIDS, Daniels et al. (2014) suggest that these
observations may just be the result of measurement error rather than of
genuinely rich respondents. Indeed, a detailed analysis of the wealthiest
people in the survey reveals some irregularities regarding the composition
of assets and the associated income streams, supporting the measurement
error hypothesis. Since it would be imprudent to discard all “too-rich-to-be-
true” observations without replacement, I test the sensitivity of the results
by dropping the wealthiest one percent of respondents from the dataset
(therefore artificially truncating the sample to the right) and re-drawing them
from a power-law distribution.
A variable x follows a power law if all x > xmin are drawn from a
probability distribution p(x) = Cx−α, where xmin is the lower bound on
power law behaviour, the tail index α determines the weight of the tail
(with lower α indicating a fatter tail), and C is a normalization constant
that ensures that the total probability sums to one. I follow the procedure
proposed by Clauset et al. (2009) to estimate α under different levels of xmin.
In the NIDS, our estimates cluster around α ≈ 1.0 for the top 1-5 percent
of the wealth distribution, although the fit of the distribution is poor. In
the PIT, we are more successful at fitting a Pareto distribution for the top
one percent of tax filers, and estimate a tail index of α ≈ 1.5. This estimate
is closer to Pareto’s original findings (Pareto, 1897), as well as to recent
findings on the wealth distribution of advanced economies (Gabaix, 2009,
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Klass et al., 2006, Vermeulen, 2014). I resample the richest one percent of
respondents (all individuals with more than one million Rand) using both
the fitted (α = 1.0) and “theoretical” (α = 1.5) distributions, averaging the
distributional results from 100 inverse random draws.19
3.3.4 Summary: Biases in NIDS and PIT
The main limitation of the NIDS is its coverage of the top tail of the wealth
distribution and the quality of its responses across the distribution. Targeted
wealth surveys such as the Eurosystem HFCS or the American SCF are
specifically designed to reduce the sampling and response biases, and to
ensure a high level of accuracy of responses by using a detailed questionnaire
and extensive consistency checks during and after the computer-assisted
interviews.20 Nevertheless, the HCFS understates aggregate household
wealth (and particularly financial wealth) compared to the national accounts
(ECB 2013b), and understates wealth inequality compared to results from
rich lists (Vermeulen, 2014). Given the fact that wealth was just a “special
theme” in the second Wave in the NIDS, the biases that are associated with
wealth surveys are thus likely to be much more severe in the South African
case.
Being mandatory and cross-checked in tax inspections, the PIT is not
subject to the same biases as the NIDS. However, the main weakness of
the PIT is the limited coverage of investment income and the challenges
19Appendix B.4 provides details on the resampling methodology and summarises results
on the fitted distribution.
20In the U.S. SCF and the French and Spanish HFCS surveys, information from
tax records is used to create a separate sampling frame of wealthy individuals
(Saez and Zucman, 2014, Vermeulen, 2014). In other countries, the HCFS attempts to
oversample wealthy households on the basis of regional income (Vermeulen, 2014). In
some European countries, the HFCS attempts to increase the sampling and response rates
of wealthy households by providing incentives against the selection of “easier” households
by interviewers. (see, e.g., Albacete et al., 2012). The survey design also contains measures
to increase the accuracy of responses. For instance, households are not asked about the
value of their life insurance, but about the inception date, contract duration, frequency and
amount of contributions. In addition to over 150 internal checks, all survey responses are
then analysed by experts, and inconsistent or unusual responses are confirmed or corrected
in follow-up interviews (Albacete et al., 2012; ECB 2013a).
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in drawing conclusions about the distribution of the underlying assets and
liabilities. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the coverage and biases in the
survey data and the tax records.
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current contributions, but no





Good for most assets except
domestic equities and assets
held through trusts








Sampling bias Severe n/a
Response bias Limited n/a
Recall bias Severe
Limited (false responses for
tax evasion reasons only)
Note: Comparison of coverage and biases in the NIDS and PIT data.
88
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.4. WEALTH DISTRIBUTION: RESULTS
3.4 Wealth distribution: Results
3.4.1 Individual results
Despite the differences in the two data sources, their results on income
inequality coincide closely. One percent of the employed population receives
11–12 percent of all labour income; together, the top decile receives 43–46
percent. Overall inequality is high, with a Gini coefficient of 0.58 in the
PIT and 0.60 in the NIDS. Although these figures reflect poorly on the
South African labour market, their comparability supports the validity of
our scaling approach.21
With regards to investment income and wealth, the results coincide less
neatly. Particularly top inequality is much higher in the tax records than in
the survey data: one percent of the population owns 60 percent of wealth in
the NIDS, but receives almost 90 percent of investment income in the PIT.
Yet both sources agree on the extent of overall wealth inequality – likely
because they are so close to the upper bound: ten percent of the population
own almost all wealth (95 percent) and receive almost all investment income
(99 percent); in both sources, the Gini coefficient approaches unity (see Table
3.3 and Figure 3.1 for the NIDS, and Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2 for the PIT).
If these figures are in the vicinity of the truth, South Africa as a country is
as unequal as the world as a whole (see Davies et al., 2016).22
3.4.2 Concepts of wealth and combined estimates
The comparison between the NIDS and the PIT is, in theory, a comparison
between total wealth on the one hand and investment income on the other.
21The distributional metrics for labour income inequality are based on the employed
population only. For consistency, I assign missing incomes to 60 percent of the unobserved
population in the PIT (based on an employment rate of 40 percent in the NIDS in the
population aged 15+) before following the scaling approach for the remaining share of
non-filers (100− 60− 17 percent = 23 percent of the population).
22Davies et al. (2016) estimate the global wealth distribution by estimating a
relationship between income and wealth inequality (based on 31 countries with micro-
level wealth data, not including South Africa). They estimate the global Gini coefficient
at 0.91, the top 10 percent wealth share at 87 percent and the top 1 percent wealth share
at 48 percent.
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Full sample 60 95 6 -1 0.98
Top 1% resampled, α = 1.0 69 96 5 -1 0.93
Top 1% resampled, α = 1.5 45 92 9 -1 0.87
Income
Employed population 11 46 43 12 0.60
Note: Quantile shares, NIDS, 2010, in percent. Calculations based on weighted sample
using adult-level data and post-stratified weights.













Local interest∗ 84 98 2 0 0.98
Total investment∗ 88 99 1 0 0.99
Total investment & pensions∗ 60 96 4 0 0.96
Income
Employment income 12 43 45 12 0.58
Note: Quantile shares, PIT, 2010. Results scaled to the total adult population (see Section
3.3.3). ∗Adjusted for tax-exempt interest income.
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Figure 3.1: NIDS – Income and wealth distribution
Note: Income distribution, NIDS, 2010. Calculations based on weighted sample using
household-level data and post-stratified weights. Left panel: Kernel density curves of
logged income; right panel: Lorenz curves.
Figure 3.2: PIT – Income and wealth distribution
Note: Income distribution, PIT, 2010. Results scaled to the total adult population (see
Section 3.3.3). Left panel: Kernel density curves of logged income; right panel: Lorenz
curves.
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The coverage of the PIT is much more limited than the NIDS, but neither
of the two measures is representative of the portfolio composition in the
national accounts: The NIDS over-states the share of non-financial assets by
a factor of 2, the PIT does not include non-financial assets at all; the NIDS
under-states the share of pension assets by a factor of 3, the PIT provides
only information on current contributions.
When we use the information on current contributions to adjust the PIT
for investment income on pension assets, the top wealth shares in the PIT
start to coincide almost perfectly with those in the NIDS. The share of the
top percentile drops from 90 to “only” 60 percent; that of the top decile
adjusts from 99 to 96 percent.23 Since pension assets constitute the most
important asset class for South African households, this measure seems more
meaningful than the unadjusted measure from the PIT (and maybe even the
NIDS). However, it is likely that it constitutes a lower bound for true pension
inequality, since neither dataset provides information on interruptions to
contribution periods and pre-retirement withdrawals from pension funds –
both of which are possible under the South African system, and are likely
to be more common among lower-income households (National Treasury,
2012).24
Since the PIT provides no information from which to make a comparable
adjustment for owner-occupied housing and other non-financial assets, we
instead “impute” the estimates of inequality from the NIDS by calculating
a weighted average of the individual distributional metrics. With a Gini
coefficient of at least 0.96 for pension assets (PIT), 0.99 for other financial
assets (PIT) and 0.90 for non-financial assets (NIDS), and with portfolio
23If we were to replace reported pensions in the NIDS with comparable imputations
(using a fixed share of labour income as current contributions), the wealth share of the
top one percent would drop to only 50 percent and re-introduce a wedge between results
from the two datasets. However, the pension adjustment has much less impact on the
wealth share of the top 10 percent (91 compared to 95 percent).
24To estimate the value of pension assets in the PIT, I assumed a price inflation of 6
percent, wage inflation of 8 percent, investment returns of 10 percent and a starting age
of 25 to calculate the current value of all pension and retirement fund contributions. To
account for pre-retirement withdrawals, I also applied a uniform 50 percent discount to the
current value of these assets (although not for assets in retirement annuities). Appendices
B.6 and C.2 give more details on the methodology.
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shares of 36, 32 and 32 percent in the national accounts, we find a combined
Gini coefficient of 0.95 and top wealth shares of at least 67 and 93 percent
for the richest centile and decile.
While the findings on tail wealth are thus highly sensitive with regard
to the concept of wealth under study, our finding that 10 percent of the
population owns at least 90–95 percent of all wealth remains robust across
all specifications.25
3.4.3 Resampling of tail wealth
The fact that top income wealth shares in the NIDS are comparable to the
PIT is surprising given that survey data tends to understate the very top
of the distribution. Given the relatively small number of observations on
wealth in the NIDS (18,820 observations, of which only half are non-zero),
our results risk being determined by a few (potentially erroneous) outliers
rather than by the appropriate representation of genuinely wealthy people.
To test the robustness of our estimates to such potential outliers, we can
re-sample the top tail from a fitted or a theoretical distribution.
I drop and re-draw all individuals with a net worth of more than
one million Rand (the top one percent of the wealth distribution in the
NIDS) from the distributions described in section 3.3.3. While the fitted
parametrization (α = 1.0) results in even higher top wealth shares than the
original data, the top one percent share drops to 45 percent when using the
“theoretical” tail index of α = 1.5. Since all other data in this chapter suggest
that inequality is higher in South Africa than in the developed economies for
which the tail index of 1.5 was derived, these results should be interpreted
25Instead of broadening the coverage of assets in the PIT, we could also focus on a
more limited concept of wealth in the NIDS. Looking at financial assets only, the degree
of inequality in the NIDS surpasses even the unadjusted measure of inequality in the
PIT; with regard to investment income, we find that inequality is somewhat lower. Note,
however, that only 430 individuals reported non-zero investment income (compared to
13,505 individuals with non-zero wealth).
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as a lower bound. For the top 10 percent wealth share, our lower bound
remains robust at 90–95 percent under all parametrizations.26
3.4.4 Comparison with rich lists
For the wealthiest of all people, “rich lists” can provide additional
information. According to the Forbes Africa’s 50 Richest list, 10 South
Africans had a combined net worth of $25 billion (R390 billion at year-end
exchange rates) in 2015, almost five percent of the entire wealth of all 54
million citizens. New World Wealth, a consultancy, estimates that there
were 46,800 high net worth individuals with a combined wealth of $184
billion (R2,140 billion) in the country in 2014. When compared with the
aggregate data from the household sector balance sheets, this suggests that
0.1 percent of the South African population owns a quarter of total household
wealth.27 This high share lends some support to the very high top wealth
shares presented in this chapter. If anything, our top wealth shares could
be understated due to the failure to capture the very top of the distribution
(NIDS) or their assets in complex ownership structures (PIT).
3.4.5 The equalising effect of households
Wealth surveys typically use households rather than individuals as the main
unit of analysis (see, for example, ECB 2013a, 2013b). As with income and
consumption, household-level data on wealth is understood to better reflect
the fact that many assets and debts tend to be owned or guaranteed jointly
by members of the household (such as the family house and mortgage, joint
bank accounts, or even through the contingent division of property in the
case of bereavement or divorce).
26As a further sensitivity analysis, I also attempt to resample only those individuals
that were identified as “outliers” in a multivariate outlier analysis (see Appendix B.3),
and find that the results remain robust. For income, the findings are robust to resampling
the top one percent from a fitted distribution with α = 2.0.
27Assuming the wealth concept used by New World Wealth is consistent with the
national accounts. Data available from Forbes (www.forbes.com/africa-billionaires/
list/) and the New World Wealth South Africa Wealth Report 2015 description
(www.nw-wealth.com) (full report not accessed).
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If we consider household instead of individual-level data, the degree of
inequality softens somewhat: The wealth share of the top 10 percent drops
by 6 percentage points; the share of the middle 40 percent increase as much.28
This reflects the fact that the pooling of wealth within households smoothes
out some of the spikes in the wealth distribution, while the distribution for
the bottom half of the population is largely unaffected. Although the PIT
provides no information on household membership, we would expect to find
a similar pattern in the tax database.
3.5 Other analyses on the wealth distribution
3.5.1 Wealth distribution and demography
One advantage of surveys is that they contain questions on a wide range
of topics other than personal finance, which allows researchers to analyse
the wealth distribution by any number demographic, geographic or other
characteristics. Tax records contain much less demographic information; in
the case of the PIT we can infer only age and gender of the tax filer. In
this section, I use these data for an overview of the wealth distribution by
demographic characteristics.
Wealth and age
From a theoretical perspective, the most interesting link between wealth
distribution and demography is that between wealth and age. According to
the life-cycle hypothesis of consumption and saving, individuals save during
their work-life and dis-save during retirement (Ando and Modigliani, 1963,
Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954). This implies that very young and very old
people should be asset poor, while people at their transition to retirement
should be the wealthiest group.
Indeed, Figure 3.3 confirms this theory in the NIDS: Among individuals
with non-zero wealth, median wealth increases steadily from less than R5,000
for youths to around R15,000 for the pre-retirement cohort, before declining
28Detailed results for the household-level income and wealth distribution are provided
in Appendix B.7.
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back to R10,000 for the 75+ group. However, it would be incorrect to deduce
that wealth inequality is explained entirely by the demographic pyramid:
For all age groups < 55, within-group wealth inequality is as least as high as
overall wealth inequality. A decomposition based on the Theil index suggests
that less than one percent of total wealth inequality is explained by the
inequality between age groups.
Inter-generational inequality is even less pronounced in the PIT. While
there is a slight hump-shaped curve between ages 30 and 70—particular for
lower-income people—, people under 30 and over 70 constitute the wealthiest
age groups in the tax database. This discrepancy between the NIDS and the
PIT could suggest that inheritances and bequests play a more important role
among relatively well-to-do tax filers than among the larger population in the
NIDS.29
Wealth, race and gender
Although there is no economic reason to expect a correlation between
wealth and race or gender, the survey data confirms the suspicion that the
degree of inequality remains high between racial groups – a legacy of the
system of apartheid, which denied black citizens the access to most forms
of capital until 1994 (see, e.g., McGrath, 1982). However, the NIDS also
shows that the degree of inequality within the African group exceeds that
for the overall population, being much higher than the level of inequality
within any other racial group (see Figure 3.4). The decomposition based
on the Theil index suggests that less than five percent of total wealth
inequality and less than 15 percent ot total income inequality is explained
by between-group inequality. This is consistent with earlier findings on
the South African income distribution, according to which the structure of
29In theory, the observed pattern could also point to a selection bias: Since very young
and very old people are not generally employed, only those with high investment income
become subject to tax filing requirements. However, the pattern persists when calculating
the age-wealth profiles for recipients of employment income only. Since I do not track
individuals over time, the life-cycle profile might also be shaped by generational effects
(e.g., the greater impact of the financial crisis and economic downturn on younger people).
I do not control for these.
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inequality is increasingly shaped by growing inequality within racial groups
(Leibbrandt et al., 2010, Van der Berg, 2010).
With regards to gender, both sources show little difference in the mean
and median wealth of men and women, although the larger number of men in
the PIT implies that men receive a larger share of total reported investment
income than female taxpayers (60 percent versus 40 percent). In neither case
does the Theil index suggest that inequality between men and women plays
a role in explaining total wealth inequality.
Overall, the demographic analyses paint a more favourable picture of the
quality of the survey data than the aggregate analyses did earlier: although
the NIDS struggles to capture financial assets and very wealthy individuals,
it seems to provide robust results on the wealth distribution in the majority
population.30
3.5.2 Joint distribution of income and wealth
Although wealth generates income in the form of dividends, interest and
rents, income and wealth are not generally closely linked. In the NIDS, the
rank correlation between total income and wealth is 0.35; in the PIT, the
equivalent figure for gross and investment income is 0.5. Both figures are in
line with the correlations observed in other countries (0.2-0.6 in the OECD
countries, see OECD, 2015).
The correlation between income and wealth is most pronounced in the
upper end of the distribution: About 70 percent of people in the top income
quintile of the NIDS are also in the top two wealth quintiles (and vice-versa),
explaining why the correlation may be higher in the unscaled PIT than in the
NIDS. With regards to race, we find a much higher correlation for the (richer
and more egalitarian) white sub-population than for the African majority
(as seen in the concentration curves presented in Figure 3.4). This suggests
that the wealth of white households corresponds more closely to their incomes
than in the African sub-population, where even high-income households often
have very little wealth (and vice-versa).
30Detailed results for wealth by race and gender in Appendix B.7.
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Figure 3.3: Wealth by age
Note: Median wealth by age, NIDS and PIT, 2010, in Rand. Calculations exclude
individuals with zero wealth / investment income. Left panel: NIDS, Right panel: PIT.
Figure 3.4: NIDS – Wealth by race
Note: Wealth distribution by racial group, NIDS, 2010. Calculations based on weighted
sample using adult-level data and post-stratified weights. Top left panel: Kernel density
curves of logged wealth; top right panel: Lorenz curves of wealth; Bottom panels:
Concentration curves for income and wealth.
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Overall, the relatively low correlation between income and wealth
suggests that the taxation of employment income targets a different group
than the taxation of investment income and wealth. Alongside the greater
degree of concentration of wealth, this discrepancy highlights the policy
importance of studying the wealth distribution in addition to the income
distribution.
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Table 3.5: NIDS – Wealth distribution by asset class
Full sample Trimmed sample
Top 1% Top 10% Top 1% Top 10%
Wealth 61 95 47 92
Total assets 62 95 50 92
Total liabilities 51 99 42 99
One-shot wealth 63 97 60 97
Pension and life assets 99 100 97 100
Non-pension financial assets 96 99 96 99
Real estate assets 54 80 32 71
Capital income 70 100 58 100
Note: Quantile shares, NIDS, 2010, in percent. Calculations based on weighted sample
using adult-level data and post-stratified weights. “Trimmed sample” excludes outliers
(see Appendix B.3).
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3.6 Conclusion
Wealth is much more unequally distributed than income. One percent of
the South African population owns at least half of all wealth, the top decile
together owns more than 90–95 percent. With a Gini coefficient of about
0.95, wealth is as unequally distributed within South Africa as it is in the
world at large. For labour income, the equivalent figures are roughly 10 and
45 percent, and the Gini coefficient is close to 0.6.
The fact that a large majority of people are asset-poor is not unique to
South Africa: Even in rich countries, the wealth share of the bottom half
amounts to only about five percent of total (OECD, 2015, Piketty, 2014).
What stands out, however, is the small wealth share of the middle of the
distribution, or the virtual absence of a socioeconomic group that Piketty
refers to as “patrimonial” or “propertied” middle class – the emergence
of which “was the principal structural transformation of the distribution of
wealth in the developed countries in the twentieth century.” (Piketty, 2014,
p. 260). Table 3.6 compares the results for South Africa with other countries.
This chapter started with the hypothesis that the two data sets on
investment income and wealth were incomplete and inaccurate, and needed
to be integrated in order to gain robust estimates of the wealth distribution.
I expected the survey data to represent only the bottom 95 percent or so
of the population, while I knew that the tax data only covered the top 20
percent. I was thus surprised to find that the two data sets led to surprisingly
similar conclusions once I defined appropriate censoring rules and parametric
assumptions for the underlying distributions. Although the wealth shares for
the top one percent of the population ranged from around 50 to just under
100 percent, the wealth share for the top 10 percent remained close to 90–95
percent across a variety of specifications. For labour income (whose definition
is more comparable between the survey and the tax data), the distributional
metrics coincided almost perfectly between the two sources.
The comparability of the scaled estimates could be a result of the
extreme degree of concentration: With a top 10 percent wealth share above 90
percent even in the survey that was thought to understate wealth inequality,
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South Africa∗ 95 61 Survey author’s calculations
South Africa∗ 96 60 PIT + pensions author’s calculations
South Africa 72 40 Estimated Stierli et al. (2014)
United States 75 34 Survey Federal Reserve Bank (2014)
United States 79 37 Survey + Forbes Vermeulen (2014)
United States 77 58 PIT Saez and Zucman (2014)
France 50 18 Survey ECB (2013b)
France 51 19 Survey + Forbes Vermeulen (2014)
France∗ 61 21 Estate Tax Piketty et al. (2006)
Germany 59 24 Survey ECB (2013b)
Germany 68 33 Survey + Forbes Vermeulen (2014)
World 87 48 Estimated Davies et al. (2016)
Note: Comparison of top wealth shares across countries and data sources. ∗Asterisks
denote wealth shares on the level of individuals rather than households.
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all other estimates were bound to be close. Yet despite its shortcomings,
this study concludes on the optimistic note that we can learn a lot about
the wealth distribution even if the data are incomplete and inaccurate. This
finding should provide some encouragement to researchers practitioners who
wish to study wealth inequality in other countries in which the data is even
scarcer than in South Africa.
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Conclusion
South Africa has been a pioneer with regard to collecting and publishing data
on household wealth. It is the first developing country to include detailed
sectoral balance sheets in its national accounts, one of a few countries with a
large-scale household wealth survey, and one of only a handful that gives
researchers access to anonymised records from tax authorities. Yet, few
researchers have given these data the attention it deserves. This dissertation
endeavoured to change this.
The first chapter of this dissertation introduced the importance of
balance sheets in macroeconomic analyses by highlighting the discrepancy
between flow and stock measures of saving even over longer periods of time.
The most commonly used measurement of saving stems from the income
side of the national accounts, in which saving is calculated as the residual
between disposable income and consumption expenditures. According to this
measure, household savings rates in South Africa have been in steady decline
over the last five decades, falling from 10 percent of GDP in the 1950s to
zero over the last years.
Looking instead at the balance sheet side of the national accounts
(where saving is calculated as the change in wealth between two periods
of time), the findings presented in this dissertation showed that household
wealth increased by 5–10 percent of GDP per year over the last five decades.
Households may not have been “putting aside” their incomes but have
nevertheless grown richer, owing to a steady increase in the value of existing
assets in their portfolios. Provided that households take these capital gains
into account when making their saving and spending decisions, the chapter
thus suggested that we would understate the extent to which households
are making future-oriented choices if we looked only at the flow measure of
saving.
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Chapter 1 took a macroeconomic perspective on saving, but also
introduced a critical distributional question. With wealth often being
highly unequally distributed, would asset revaluations not disproportionately
benefit only a small share of the population? Although aggregate saving is
much higher under the balance sheet perspective than under the conventional
view, the chapter thus concluded that the majority of the population likely
saved little under either perspective.
The second chapter of this dissertation took a different angle on the
discrepancies between flows and stocks in the long run, examining the
relationship between the conventional measure of saving and the development
of wealth over time and across countries. Following the approach proposed
by Piketty and Zucman (2014), I decomposed the development of the South
African private wealth-income ratio into savings-induced and revaluations-
induced effects and compared the results to the authors’ findings for the
major advanced economies. In contrast to the household-centered perspective
taken in the previous chapter, I also introduced a distinction between asset
revaluations that are explained by corporate savings and those that are not.
While Chapter 1 showed that households had (on aggregate) become
much wealthier than their (flow) savings behaviour would have implied,
Chapter 2 showed that this discrepancy was nevertheless less pronounced
than in the advanced economies. Private wealth amounted to 240 percent
of national income in 1975, in line with the levels of 200–300 percent in
the major advanced economies. Today, South Africa’s private wealth-income
ratio still stands at 255 percent, while those of the advanced economies have
doubled to 400–700 percent.
Using Piketty and Zucman’s approach, I traced this divergence to
structural differences between the countries: While the prolonged growth
of private wealth in rich countries was driven primarily by household savings
and the booming housing market, South Africa’s more recent growth in
wealth was generated almost entirely through corporate savings and the
strong performance of the stock market. Since financial wealth tends to be
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more highly concentrated than housing assets, this is likely to have different
distributional implications than those of Piketty’s sample of rich countries.
The analyses in Chapter 2 therefore raised similar distributional
concerns as Chapter 1. In combination with the high income share of capital
relative to labour (α ≈ 40%), the low overall wealth-income ratio pointed to a
very high macroeconomic rate of return on capital (r ≈ 15% per year), which
likely accrued to a small share of the population only. With very limited data
on household-level wealth, however, the chapter could not quantify the size
of this sub-population. To improve the transparency of the personal wealth
distribution, Chapter 3 turned to the measurement of wealth inequality in
South Africa.
When I started writing this dissertation, the only information on the
South African wealth distribution came from the second wave of the National
Income Dynamics Survey (NIDS), which was conducted in 2010–2011.
Although the NIDS showed that wealth was highly unequally distributed,
this information was deemed to be of limited accuracy, owing to the social
sensitivity and cognitive complexity of wealth-related questions as well
as to the lower tendency of wealthy households to participate in surveys
(Daniels et al., 2014). To gain a more robust perspective on the wealth
distribution, I attempted to compare the NIDS to a previously unpublished
dataset of almost 1.2 million personal income tax (PIT) records for the 2010–
2011 tax year. Since tax filing is mandatory for people with incomes above
certain thresholds, I argued that the PIT data should not be subject to the
same biases as the NIDS. It is, however, subject to different limitations: Only
some forms of wealth generate taxable investment incomes, and less than 20
percent of the South African population file income taxes at all.
To render the data comparable, I treated the PIT as a proxy for the
wealth of the tax-filing tail of the distribution, and “scaled” the results to
the total population by simulating the wealth of non-filers from a bottom-
censored lognormal distribution. As a robustness analysis, I corrected the
NIDS for potential misreporting of top wealth; dropping and re-drawing the
richest one percent from a top-censored Pareto distribution. Since neither the
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NIDS nor the PIT reflected the asset composition in the national accounts,
I also combined the estimates using the PIT to measure the concentration
of financial assets, the NIDS to measure the concentration of non-financial
assets, and the national accounts to define appropriate weights.
A highly encouraging result of Chapter 3 was the extent to which the
measures of income inequality coincided between the two data sources: I
found that one percent of the population earned 11–12 percent of all incomes,
while ten percent earned 43–46 percent. Although this overlap provided
support for the scaling approach, the wealth distribution remained much
harder to pinpoint. Depending on the measure used, top one percent shares
ranged from 60 percent in the NIDS to almost 90 percent in the PIT. The
broader the measure under consideration, however, the more the two sources
started to converge. Despite the limitations of the data, I eventually felt
confident to conclude that ten percent of the population owned at least 90–
95 percent of all wealth. With a Gini coefficient of about 0.95 (compared to
0.60 for incomes), this makes South Africa as unequal as the world at large.
The extreme degree of economic inequality in South Africa is often linked
to the legacy of apartheid. Black citizens were denied access to most forms
of capital until 1994, leading to a highly unequal wealth distribution between
racial groups. While the analyses presented in Chapter 3 confirmed that non-
white households are still much poorer on average than white households,
it also showed that inequality within the African majority population far
exceeds the inequality of all other groups. Paradoxical as it sounds, the
presence of (disproportionately wealthy) white households lowers overall
wealth inequality in South Africa. This finding supports existing research
on incomes, according to which South Africas unequal income distribution is
increasingly shaped by growing inequality within groups (Leibbrandt et al.,
2010). It also suggests that some of the policies aimed at empowering black
South Africans have disproportionately benefited a new economic elite.
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Policy Implications
In contrast to advanced economies (where wealth inequality has been
growing alongside the aggregate level of wealth), South Africa struggles with
extreme wealth inequality at low aggregate wealth levels. Given this specific
situation, this dissertation suggests that any policies aimed at lowering wealth
inequality should balance redistribution from the top with wealth formation
at the middle and bottom of the distribution.
The first policy lever to promote more egalitarian wealth formation is
thus to enhance saving among poorer and middle-class households. Many
areas of economic policy can contribute toward this aim: Monetary policy
can promote saving and discourage capital flight by providing a stable
macroeconomic environment, and regulatory and tax authorities can help
to enforce or encourage wealth formation in specific asset classes. The
introduction of restricted tax-free savings accounts in March 2015 has already
had an effect in this regard: The market-research firm intellidex reports that
more than 260,000 accounts were opened within the first year of the policy,
one fifth of which are estimated to belong to first-time savers.31
A bigger effect could potentially be achieved through pension reform.
Pension assets constitute the most important form of wealth despite low
participation and preservation rates (only half of formal employees are
covered by occupational pension schemes, and particularly lower-income
households frequently cash out their pension assets when switching between
jobs). Recent reforms have already sought to raise contributions and limit
early withdrawals from provident funds by harmonizing the tax treatment
and annuitization requirements with other pension funds. In addition,
the National Treasury is currently considering comprehensive changes in
the decision architecture of contributors, such as automatic enrolment,
default investment strategies, default preservation, and default pay-out as
31Source: intellidex, June 2016. Report available at www.intellidex.co.za/TFSA2016.
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annuities.32 The experience from other countries shows that such changes
can have a dramatic impact on people’s savings behaviour (???).
The second policy lever could be a revenue-neutral shift in taxation from
labour to capital. The majority of tax revenues collected from households
currently comes from employment incomes (35 percent of total tax revenues),
whereas investment incomes constitute merely 1 percent of the total revenue
and wealth itself is taxed only through the very ineffective estate duty
(0.1 percent of total revenues). Since income and wealth is not perfectly
correlated, this means that households at the top of the income distribution
might be taxed more heavily than households at the top of the wealth
distribution. Shifting a larger share of the tax burden to capital (as foreseen,
at least directionally, in the proposals on estate tax reform by the Davis Tax
Committee) could be especially beneficial to the goal of equitable wealth
formation if the additional yield were used to offset the shortfall from the
tax exemptions on small savings accounts or pension contributions.
As the discussion of the data in Chapter 3 indicated, however, there
are practical difficulties with regard to an effective taxation of top wealth.
Most forms of wealth are convertible and mobile, and can easily be shifted
between asset classes, ownership structures and tax jurisdictions. Since such
wealth management is costly, the richest households are most likely to take
advantage of any loopholes. The recent Panama Papers leak indicated the
extent to which the efficacy of wealth taxes is limited by the fact that large
fortunes can be moved out of the reach of national tax authorities. This
highlights both the importance and the challenge of designing wealth taxation
in a way that it does not end up targeting the nascent propertied middle class
instead.
The third lever, which is related to the first, is to reduce indebtedness
among poorer and middle-class households. Although the majority of debt
is often taken to fund asset purchases, the NIDS suggests that about five
percent of the population has debts that exceed the value of their assets, and
that this share is higher among lower-income households. Other data suggests
32Draft default regulations of 22 July 2015 available at http://www.treasury.gov.za/
publications/RetirementReform/
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that lower-income segments make considerable use of unsecured consumer
credit, which is often extended under very high interest rates and obscure
terms.33 A greater emphasis on financial consumer protection and financial
literacy training could help citizens make more informed financial decisions
and protect them from debt-related poverty-traps.
Research Implications
Although South Africa is ahead of most other countries with regard to
collecting macro- and microeconomic balance sheet data, both data sources
are still in their infancy. Any additions and revisions to these data sources
may lead to different results on the level and distribution of private wealth.
With regards to the macro-level data, the full integration between the
flow and stock side of the national accounts is still underway at the time
of writing this dissertation. Flows and stocks are linked through returns on
capital, and the fact that my own estimate of these returns is much higher
than those in other countries could indicate that wealth is still understated
relative to incomes. It would be valuable to calculate returns on the level
of individual asset classes to identify the origins of such an understatement
and guide the integration of the flow and stock side of the national accounts
going forward. Such an exercise would be straightforward for researchers with
access to more granular national accounts data than currently published by
the SARB.
With regards to the micro-level data, the discrepancies between survey,
tax and national accounts data revealed the extent of the current limitations.
One reason for the poor quality of micro-level wealth data is that neither of
the existing sources really intended to measure wealth: the NIDS is not
designed to be a wealth survey, and the PIT system is not intended to be
a wealth tax. Both sources could be improved, however, without a major
overhaul of the existing systems. The accuracy of the survey data with
regard to wealth could be improved by adopting wealth-specific sampling
33Source: National Credit Regulator, Consumer Credit Market Report, June 2016; The
Economist, Payday Mayday, August 16 2014
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and survey design strategies for wealthy households that were developed for
the recent Household Finance and Consumption Survey of the Eurosystem
(see Chapter 3). The questionnaires for wealthy households could then be
tied to the existing NIDS panel. The coverage of the tax data could be
improved by linking the existing PIT records with information from the
dividend withholding tax (for equities), the deeds office (for real estate),
and the credit bureaus (for debts), and by linking the PIT files of trusts
to those of their beneficiaries.34 Time itself will also help: as more data is
released in the future, researchers will be able to identify anomalies over time
and arrive at more robust estimates in panel analyses.
Aside from statistics, this dissertation introduced several economic
questions on private wealth in South Africa. In particular, it did not answer
the question of why it is that wealth is so much more concentrated than
incomes. From a theoretical perspective, several factors that can contribute
to this disconnect: a gradient between income and saving (do the rich
save more? ), a gradient between wealth and investment opportunities (do
the rich get better returns on their savings? ), a gradient between wealth,
demographics and bequests (do the rich have fewer children to whom they
bequeath their assets? ), or a distortion created by policies such as means-
tested government grants. A better understanding of the role of these
factors would allow to make more targeted recommendations on building
a propertied middle class in South Africa.
34To protect the anonymity of tax filers, these links would have to be made by SARS
before depersonalising the ID numbers.
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Appendix A
Saving and wealth in the
national accounts
This appendix contains additional information on the data on saving and
wealth in the South African national accounts (section A.1), which were
used in Chapter 1 and 2. It also elaborates on two methodological aspects
of Chapter 1, namely the calculation of revaluation effects (section A.2) and
the estimation of depreciation expenses (section A.3).
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A.1 National accounts data
Tables A.1 and A.2 provide an overview over the data on saving in the South
African National Income and Production Accounts; Table A.3 shows how
saving can be derived from the Balance Sheets. Figure A.1 illustrates the
connection between the National Income and Production Accounts and the
Balance Sheets in the System of National Accounts.
Assets, liabilities and wealth
Wealth is defined as the residual between the market value of all assets and
liabilities, a quantity also known as ‘net worth’. Although the combined
assets of the household sector typically exceed its liabilities, the net worth of
individual households can also be negative.
The SNA includes all marketable financial and non-financial assets as
assets, but excludes non-marketable assets such as human or institutional
capital. Non-financial assets include housing assets (residential buildings and
land) and other tangible assets (non-residential buildings and land, plant and
machinery, as well as cultivated assets) of the household sector. Financial
assets consist of cash equivalents, bonds, equities and foreign financial assets.
In the South African balance sheets financial assets are recorded as assets
with monetary institutions, interests in pension funds and long-term insurers,
and other financial assets. A breakdown by asset class can be estimated
by applying the portfolio composition of the respective counterparties—
monetary institutions, pension funds and long-term insurers as well as unit
trusts—to the total of household assets held with these institutions. In
practice, I consider all assets with monetary institutions as cash equivalents
and apply the portfolio composition of unit trusts to the other financial assets
component.
Private wealth, public wealth and national wealth
Since the national accounts are based on the residency principle, the wealth of
a nation is the wealth of its residents (all institutional units with a ‘center of
economic interest’ in the country). In the national accounts, these residents
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Table A.1: Construction of national accounts data




The responsibility of compiling the South African national
accounts is split between StatsSA (production and income
side), and the SARB (expenditure side and institutional sector
accounts). To reconcile the SARB estimates with the StatsSA





Estimates of the main expenditure aggregates are compiled
by the SARB on the basis of household surveys and verified
against supply and use estimates in the benchmark year. In all
subsequent quarters, the base-year estimates are extrapolated
using retail sales data from surveys and other sources (e.g.,




Non-financial assets of households comprise residential and
non- residential buildings, non-agricultural land, construction
works, machinery and equipment, computer and related
equipment, transport equipment, agricultural land and
orchards, and inventories at market value. Stocks are
derived by the SARB from national account capital stock
measures; market values are obtained by multiplying them
by an appropriate asset price index (in the case of residential
buildings, an average house price index). The capital stock
itself is constructed on the basis of the flows of capital
formation and capital consumption in the NIPA (‘perpetual
inventory method’) (Kuhn, 2010).
Financial assets
of households
Financial assets of households comprise assets with monetary
institutions; interest in pension funds and long-term insurers;
equities, bonds and other domestic financial assets; as well
as financial assets abroad. Data on financial assets are
sourced by the SARB from monetary institutions, pension
and provident funds and long-term insurers as well as other




Financial liabilities of households consist mainly of mortgage
advances and consumer credit. Data on financial liabilities
are sourced by the SARB from the monthly regulatory returns
submitted to the Bank Supervision Department (for mortgage
advances) from the National Treasury and from industry
associations (Kuhn, 2010).
Note: Details on the construction of income, expenditure and wealth in the South African
national accounts.
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Table A.2: Household saving in the NIPA
Account Categories Code 2014






1 Compensation of employees 6240 1 731
2 Property income received 6827 396
2a Interest 6828 54
2b Dividends 6829 160
2c
Property income attributed to
insurance policy holders
6830 182
2d Rent on land and subsoil assets 6831 0
3 Less: Property income paid 6832 167
3a Interest 6833 164
3b Rent on land and subsoil assets 6834 3






5 Social benefits received 6836 326
6 Other current transfers received 6837 211
6a Non-life insurance claims 6838 141
6b Miscellaneous current transfers 6839 70
7 Less: Taxes on income and wealth 6845 354
8 Less: Social contributions paid 6840 207
9 Less: Other current transfers paid 6841 150
9a Net non-life insurance premiums 6842 141
9b Miscellaneous current transfers 6843 9






Adjustment for the change in net
equity in pension funds reserves
6845 39
12∗ Less: Residual 6846 6
13 Total available resources 6847 2 304
14 Less: Final consumption expenditure 6007 2299
15 Gross saving 6848 5
16 Less: Consumption of fixed capital 6849 59
17 Net saving 6200 -54
Capital
account
15 Gross saving 6848 5
16 Receivable capital transfers 6850 18
17 Less: Payable capital transfers 6851 0
18 Less: Change in assets∗∗ 6852 70
19 Net lending (+) / borrowing (−) 6855 -47
Note: Household savings in the National Income and Production Accounts, 2014, in ZAR
billions. ∗Statistical discrepancy between the expenditure components and gross domestic
product; ∗∗Gross fixed capital formation and changes in inventories.
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Table A.3: Household wealth in the Balance Sheet
Categories Code 2013 2014
Assets
Non-financial assets 6920 2 583 2 853
Residential buildings 6921 2 126 2 358
Other non-financial assets 6922 458 495




Interest in pension funds
and long-term insurers
6925 3 430 3 810
Other financial assets 6926 2 257 2 388




Liabilities 6928 1 696 1 783
Mortgage advances 6929 833 854
Other debt 6930 868 929






liabilities and net wealth
6932 9 032 9 910
Note: Household wealth in the Household Sector Balance Sheets, 2013 and 2014, in ZAR
billions.
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are grouped into three institutional sectors: households, corporations and the
public sector. The household sector includes private households, non-profit
institutions serving households as well as private trusts and friendly societies.
The public sector comprises all levels of government, non-profit institutions
controlled by the government and social security funds. The corporate sector
consists of financial and non-financial corporations and quasi-corporations
(unincorporated businesses with separate financial accounts), whether they
are owned by households or government entities. Unincorporated businesses
without separate financial accounts are included in the household or the
public sector respectively.
When it comes to flow variables, the household and corporate sector are
typically added together to form the private sector. With regards to wealth,
however, the household sector alone is sufficient to represent the private
sector (see Piketty, 2014, Piketty and Zucman, 2014). This is because all
assets and liabilities of businesses are ultimately owned by the shareholders
– households, government entities or foreigners. In the first and second
case, they are reflected in the household and public sector balance sheets
respectively; in the third case, they enter the net foreign asset position (see
Section A.1).
Since the compilation of the balance sheets for the public sector is
ongoing at the time of writing, this article is limited to the analysis of
household wealth, which I refer to interchangeably as private wealth or wealth.
Denoting it by W , public wealth by Wp and and national wealth by Wn, the
relationship between all three variables can be written as: Wn = W +Wp.
National wealth, domestic wealth and net foreign assets
In a closed economy, the wealth of a country’s residents is equivalent to the
domestic capital stock (K), i.e. the capital available for production and
housing within the country’s boundaries.1 In an open economy, however, the
capital stock of a country can differ from the wealth of its residents, as part
1I include housing assets in the capital stock for consistency with Piketty’s work. In
general, housing assets are not considered to form part of the productive capital of the
economy.
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of the national wealth is invested abroad while part of the domestic capital
is held by foreigners.
The value of a country’s external assets (+) and liabilities (−) is recorded
in its international investment position (IIP). A positive IIP means that a
country’s external assets exceed its liabilities or that the country is a net
creditor, which indicates that its residents invest part of their wealth abroad.
With a negative IIP, a country is a net debtor, and its capital stock exceeds
the wealth of its residents: Wn = K + IIP .
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Figure A.1: Saving and wealth in the SNA
Note: Flow and stock measures of saving in the 2008 System of National Accounts.
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A.2 Calculating revaluation effects
The assets of the household sector are comprised of non-financial and
financial assets, the former consisting primarily of real estate and the
latter comprising equities and fixed-income securities. On the liability side,
households have debt in the form of mortgages and other obligations, while
their wealth constitutes the balancing item between the value of assets and
the amount of debt. While the latter is determined at the time that the debt
is contracted, the value of the former is determined daily on the market.
Formally speaking, the value of household assets equals the sum-product of
the quantity and the current price of each asset, such that the change in
the value of assets—and hence in wealth—between two points in time can
be decomposed into a quantity effect and a revaluation effect by applying a
standard growth accounting procedure as proposed by Scobie and Henderson
(2009).
Letting Vt denote the value, Qt the quantity and Pt the price in time
t, and letting δ be a difference operator, the standard growth accounting
procedure can be written as:
Vt = Qt × Pt (A.1)
%∆Vt = %∆Qt + %∆Pt + %∆Pt ×%∆Qt (A.2)
∆Vt = %∆Qt × Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quantity effect
+ %∆Pt × Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Price effect
+ (%∆Pt ×%∆Qt)× Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interaction term︸ ︷︷ ︸
Revaluation effect
(A.3)
To distinguish between real and inflation-induced revaluations, I use
the same approach to decompose nominal prices into a real and an inflation




Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
APPENDIX A. SAVING AND WEALTH IN THE NATIONAL ACCOUNTS
∆Vt = %∆Qt × Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quantity effect
+ %∆PRt × Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Real price effect
+ %∆CPIt × Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inflation effect
(A.4)
+ (%∆PRt ×%∆Qt)× Vt−1 + (%∆CPIt ×%∆Qt)× Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Interaction terms
+ (%∆PRt ×%∆CPIt ×%∆Qt)× Vt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Triple interaction term
In the most general terms, an increase in real wealth thus can thus stem
from two sources: a price-induced increase in the value of assets over inflation
and a change in the quantity of assets relative to liabilities.
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A.3 Estimating depreciation expenses
A.3.1 Physical capital depreciation
I estimate depreciation of durable goods using a straight-line depreciation
method over five years, based on the schedule of write-off periods acceptable
to SARS (e.g., 3 years for computers; 5 years for cars; 6 years fro furniture
and fittings). Adjusting the denominator, GDP, to include depreciation does
not change the result.
A.3.2 Human capital depreciation
Empirical studies on the depreciation of education often find a decelerating
depreciation pattern, with more rapid depreciation for people out of the
workforce than those who use their skills in the workplace. Studying the
depreciation of human capital depreciation from interrupted work careers,
for instance, Mincer and Ofek (2011) find that the reduction of future
wages associated with each year outside the workforce (corrected for tenure-
related effects) are highest in the first year and average 0.6-1.1 percent per
year in the long-run. Groot (1998) models the current value of formal
education as (1 − τ)TS (where τ denotes the depreciation rate and S the
stock of education). He estimates τ at 11-17 percent, which points to a
rapid (but decelerating) depreciation of the stock of formal education and
emphasizes the importance of lifelong learning to maintain the education
stock. Arrazola and Hevia (2004) employ a similar model, in which they
include an estimate for the contribution of work experience to the stock of
qualifications. Recognizing that work experience contributes to maintaining
the capital stock, they arrive at a depreciation rate of only 1-1.5 percent per
year.
Since the NIPA figures on education presumably include primarily
formal education and not on-the-job training, it seems most appropriate
to use Arrazola and Hevia’s estimates for employed individuals and Groot’s
estimates for individuals outside the workforce. A weighted average on the
basis of an employed share of 42 percent among the South African working-
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age population in 2014 suggests a depreciation rate of 8.5 percent.2 It is
important to recognize that this is a very rough estimate based on two
other rough estimates from different countries in different times as well as a
rough estimate on the historical education expenditure (and thence education
stock) of households in South Africa. It means that half the value of the stock
of education is lost after eight years. Only ten percent of the value remains
after 25 years, and nothing after sixty years.
2The working-age population in itself constitutes only 52 percent of the population.
Since we are interested in the depreciation of education over the future working life of the
individuals that currently invest in education, though, I use the employed share of the
working-age population as a proxy.
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Appendix B
Wealth in the NIDS
This appendix contains additional information on the wealth data in the
second wave of the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) and on the
methodology used to analyse it the third chapter of this thesis (sections B.1
- B.6). It also contains additional tables on some of the results that were
discussed only briefly in that chapter, notably on the distribution at the level
of households and the distribution of wealth within and between demographic
groups (section B.7).
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B.1 Non-response and imputations
There are two types of missing values in survey data: Unit non-response
occurs when a household or individual is not successfully interviewed
(because he or she is unavailable or refuses to participate); item non-response
occurs when an interviewee does not answer a specific question (because
he or she doesn’t know the answer or refuses to answer). For the latter
case, NIDS/SALRDU provides a set of regression-based imputations (see
Brown et al., 2015).
Since imputations run the risk of smoothing out the wealth distribution,
I do not use imputed series. However, I treat missing values in three
straightforward ways: First, I substitute missing values for zeros when this
follows from previous responses on categorical questions (e.g., setting banking
assets to zero if the answer to “Do you have a bank account?” was negative).
For some variables, the NIDS poses bracket questions (“Would you say the
amount was more or less than X Rand?”) when respondents don’t know
the value of their income or wealth. In this case, I substitute missing values
on the quantification question for the mid-point of the resulting brackets.
Third, I follow SALDRU’s approach of substituting valid answers to the
one-shot question for missing values on income and wealth, as described in
Section 3.3.1. Fourth, I substitute one-shot responses when these exceed the
bottom-up estimate in absolute terms due to item non-responses on category
level (i.e, the individual or household does not have valid responses for all
classes of assets and liabilities).1 Table B.1 provides an overview of this
process for four selected variables, while Table B.2 summarizes the process
of construction the final wealth aggregates.2
1The results from the one-shot wealth question are an imperfect substitute for bottom-
up data: On the adult level, the correlation between bottom-up and one-shot wealth is 14
percent, on the household level it is 42 percent.
2The NIDS also includes durable goods, informal loans from family or friends and
unpaid service bills or taxes. For consistency with the national accounts, I do not consider
these items as assets and liabilities. Although housing is included in the household
questionnaire, the individual questionnaire contains a question on outstanding home loans.
I use these data to impute missing values on the household level.
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Questionnaires 23 846 23 846 23 846 8986
Entries for question 17 601 16 869 16 872 6196
% of total 74 71 71 69
% of total, weighted 86 82 82 91
Categorical questions (“yes/no” or “zero/non-zero”)
Don’t know (%) 0 0 44 37
Refused (%) 0 2 5 6
Answered no/zero (%) 77 66 36 36
Answered yes/non-zero (%) 23 32 15 21
“Quantifiable” responses 4018 5449 2469 1326
% of total 17 23 10 15
Quantification questions
Missing (%) 0 1 4 0
Don’t know (%) 3 14 18 26
Refused (%) 8 20 1 1
Quantified (%) 88 65 77 73
“Raw” observations 3541 3559 1910 964
% of total 15 15 8 11
Data imputations
Drop ‘unjustified’ zeros 0 −1302 −2 0
Include missing zeros∗ 13 515 11 101 6038 2227
Values from brackets∗ 511 461 321
Used observations 17 567 13 358 8407 3512
% of total 74 56 35 39
% of total, weighted 60 45 55
Note: Treatment of missing values, selected variables, NIDS, 2010. Un-weighted counts.
*Replacement of missing values with data from categorical questions (zero values for
“no”/“zero”-answers). **Replacement of missing values with data from bracket questions
(e.g., R2500 for the bracket R0-5000).
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Table B.2: Derivation of total wealth
Response rate (%)
Item Survey Total Non-zero Notes
Private pension A 78 1
+ Life insurance A 77 5
= Assets: pension/life 80 2 (1)
Cash on hand A 76 19
+ Bank account A 60 15
+ Trusts, stocks, shares A 81 0
= Assets: other financial 66 27 (1)
Personal loan A 81 2
+ Study loan A 82 0
+ Vehicle finance A 81 1
+ Hire purchase A 82 2
+ Credit card A 81 2
+ Store card A 81 6
+ Mashonisa loan A 82 1
+ Micro loan A 82 0
= Liabilities: non-mortgage 82 11 (1)
Net business wealth A 29 1 (2)
⇒ Individual-level wealth (bottom-up) 81 31 (3)
Assets: real estate H 70 57
+ Assets: livestock H 85 4
− Liabilities: mortgages H 95 7
⇒ Household-level wealth (bottom-up) 94 59 (4)
⇒ Total individual wealth (bottom-up) 81 31 (5)
One-shot wealth A 45 17 (2)
⇒ Total individual wealth 93 55 (6)
Note: Derivation of household-level wealth data, NIDS, 2010. Calculations based on
weighted sample using post-stratified weights. Specific notes: (1) Aggregation of above
items; (2) From one-shot question; (3) Aggregation of financial assets, financial liabilities
(−), net business wealth; (4) Aggregation of real estate assets, mortgage liabilities (−),
livestock assets; (5) Allocation of real estate wealth evenly to co-owners (where available)
or household members, allocation of livestock assets evenly to household members; (6)
Imputation of valid, non-zero one-shot question for missing values or zero values in bottom-
up estimate or when one-shot response exceeds bottom-up estimate in absolute terms due
to item non-responses on category level (not all asset/liability classes with valid responses).
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B.2 Sampling and response biases
B.2.1 Sampling bias and survey weights
A sampling bias arises when a survey systematically under-samples specific
groups. SALDRU provides two sets of weights to correct for sampling biases
in the NIDS. Design weights correct for biases in the probability that a
household is included and interviewed in the survey. Post-stratified weights
further adjust the weights to reflect the national, provincial and sex-race-
age group population totals as given by current population estimates in each
wave. Since income, expenditure and wealth variables tend to be correlated
with sex, race and age, SALDRU recommends the use of these weights to
reduce the sampling bias for cross-sectional analyses (Brown et al., 2015,
Leibbrandt et al., 2009, Wittenberg, 2009).
As Table B.3 shows, the use of post-stratified weights has little impact
on the estimates of income inequality, but lowers our estimate for (top one
percent) wealth inequality significantly.
B.2.2 Response bias
A response bias arises if respondents to the survey or certain questions within
the survey differ systematically from non-respondents. The typical finding is
that better-off households are less likely to participate in surveys.
Figure B.1 depicts non-response rates by income deciles. It suggests
that non-response rates do not differ strongly between income deciles, and
are actually higher among higher-income individuals once we impute one-
shot questions for non-responses. This finding is confirmed in a formal F-
test on the null hypothesis of equal income between respondents and non-
respondents (see Table B.4). One reason for the positive gradient between
derived response rates and incomes could be that a “break-even” response to
the one-shot wealth question is counted as zero wealth, while the response
that the individual would have “something left over” needs to be quantified
to count as non-missing.
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Table B.3: Distributional implications of survey weights




Top 1 % 79 66 61
Top 10 % 98 97 95
Middle 40% 4 4 6
Bottom 50% −2 −1 −1
Total (%) 100 100 100
Income
Top 1 % 15 13 11
Top 10 % 47 48 46
Middle 40% 40 41 42
Bottom 50% 13 11 12
Total (%) 100 100 100
Note: Quantile shares, NIDS, 2010, in percent. Calculations using adult-level data.
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In contrast to the finding that non-respondents have equal (bottom-
up) or lower (derived wealth) incomes, the same tests suggest that non-
respondents are more highly educated than respondents. Although we also
find that non-respondents to the bottom-up wealth questions are more likely
to be white and female than respondents, the results are inconclusive for age,
race and gender at the level of derived wealth.
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Figure B.1: Response rates by income quintile
Note: Response rate by income quintile (total income), NIDS, 2010. Left column shows
response rates (including split between zero and non-zero quantifications) for asset-level
questions; right column shows availability of data once asset-level questions from individual
and household survey are combined with one-shot responses.
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Table B.4: Test for response bias








Individual 81 19 2 850 3 253 0.75
Household 92 8 6 506 5 872 0.39
Derived wealth
Individual 94 7 2 988 1 518 12.7∗∗∗
Household 99 1 6 457 6 647 0.00
Note: Comparison of survey means of monthly income by respondent status on wealth
questions, NIDS, 2010. “Bottom-up” refers to the completion of the wealth-related
questions in the adult- or household questionnaire, “Derived wealth” includes one-shot
wealth alongside results from both adult questionnaires. Column “F-Test” reports the
value of the F-statistic and indicates the p-value (∗∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05,
∗ : 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1). Calculations based on weighted sample using adult-level data and
post-stratified weights.
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B.3 Outliers
I attempt to systematically identify outliers using the multivariate approach
proposed by Billor et al. (2000) and implemented in STATA by Weber
(2010). This algorithm starts with the subset with the smallest Mahalabonis
distance from the whole sample, and iteratively adds all observations with
a distance smaller than some threshold, defined as a percentile of the χ2-
distribution (Billor et al., 2000, Weber, 2010). One challenge when using
this method is therefore the specification of the relevant variables, the other
is the definition of the threshold: Which characteristics plausibly predict a
household’s wealth, and how far shall we allow them to deviate from the
predicted levels before we dismiss the household as an outlier?
Ideally, we would like to determine the outliers based on a broad
set of predictive variables. Since wealth generates income in the form of
interest, dividends or rents, I include the person’s income from capital sources
(interests, dividends, rents and private pension incomes), alongside his or her
total income and an indicator whether or not he or she receives government
grants (which, being means-tested, should be inversely related to wealth). In
line with the life-cycle hypothesis of savings and wealth, I also include the
age and squared age of the individual. I include level of education of as a
proxy of lifetime income as well as financial acumen. Finally, I include an
indicator of whether a person uses sophisticated financial products – either
a private pension, life insurance or trusts, stocks and shares, and whether he
or she is a co-owner of the house.
Table B.5 summarizes the results of the multivariate outlier detection
model. As soon as we exclude about 20 people, the wealth share of the
richest 10 percent starts to stabilize at around 90 percent. The analysis of
these outliers suggests that we are excluding primarily the wealthiest people
in the survey, although we also drop several people whose wealth is low
compared to their incomes. The mean and median wealth and incomes of
the outlier population are much larger than that of the full sample.
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0.01% 24/13 497 92 47 57 17
0.05% 32/13 497 92 47 56 16
0.10% 374/13 497 90 33 56 16
0.50% 388/13 497 89 29 55 15
1% 402/13 497 89 28 55 15
5% 438/13 497 88 23 53 11
10% 454/13 497 88 24 52 11
Full sample 0/19 436 95 61 58 17
Note: Multivariate outlier detection based on the household’s income (total and capital
income), age/squared age and education level, as well as indicator variables for the
ownership of a home, a bank account, pension annuity, trusts, stocks or shares, and
of receipt of a government grant. “Threshold” denotes the 1-xth percentile of the χ2-
distribution; “Outliers” gives the number of outliers identified under this threshold.
Calculations based on weighted sample using adult-level data and post-stratified weights.
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B.4 Re-sampling of the top tail
A variable follows a power law if it is drawn from a probability distribution
p(x) = Cx−α if x ≥ xmin (B.1)
where xmin is the lower bound on power law behaviour, the “tail index”
α determines the “weight” of the tail, and C is a normalization constant
that ensures that the total probability sums up to one. Taking logarithms,
this means that ln p(x) = α ln x + constant, so a power law distribution
is consistent with a linearly downward-sloping histogram on a log-log chart
(Clauset et al., 2009, Mitzenmacher, 2001). The break-point between the
concave and straight portion of the histogram then provides an indication
for the value of xmin.
Figure B.2 shows the log-log histogram for labour income and wealth
in the NIDS. For both variables, the chart indicates power-law behaviour
only in the top 0.5 percent of the distribution. I then follow the procedure
proposed by Clauset et al. (2009) to fit and test a power law distribution
under different levels of xmin.
3 Tables B.6 and B.7 summarize the results for
the NIDS and the PIT, which suggest power-law behaviour within a larger
share of the population .
With estimates for xmin and α, we can make conditional draws from the





where U denotes uniformly distributed random number over the interval [0,1).
Since I only re-sample a limited number of observations, I run 100 draws with
replacement for each re-sampled individual, and average the resulting top-
wealth shares and Gini coefficients over these draws.
3Clauset et al. (2009) suggest to chose the threshold at which the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
statistic (which measures the distance between the density functions of the actual and
fitted data) is minimized.
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Figure B.2: Power-law distribution (NIDS)
Note: Empirical complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) on a log-log
chart, NIDS, 2010. Plots of raw adult-level data.
Table B.6: Power law distribution (NIDS)
wmin Observations % of total KS α
500 000 383 2.0 0.12∗∗∗ 1.0 (0.05)
750 000 267 1.4 0.10∗∗∗ 1.0 (0.06)
1 000 000 209 1.1 0.13∗∗∗ 1.1 (0.07)
1 250 000 160 0.8 0.15∗∗∗ 1.0 (0.08)
2 500 000 83 0.4 0.26∗∗∗ 1.0 (0.11)
5 000 000 61 0.3 0.24∗∗∗ 1.8 (0.23)
Note: Fitting the power law distribution for wealth > wmin, NIDS, 2010. Column “KS”
reports the value of the (combined) Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and indicates the p-
value (∗∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05, ∗ : 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1). Column “α” reports
standard errors in parentheses. Calculations based on weighted sample using adult-level
data and post-stratified weights.
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Table B.7: Power law distribution (PIT)
wmin Observations % of total
(unscaled)
KS α
50 000 89 857 7.7 0.01∗∗∗ 1.4 (0.01)
75 000 50 446 4.3 0.02∗∗∗ 1.4 (0.01)
100 000 34 239 2.9 0.02∗∗∗ 1.5 (0.01)
125 000 25 124 2.1 0.03∗∗∗ 1.5 (0.01)
250 000 9331 0.8 0.01 1.6 (0.02)
500 000 2968 0.3 0.02∗ 1.6 (0.03)
Note: Fitting the power law distribution for total investment income > wmin, PIT, 2010.
Column “KS” reports the value of the (combined) Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic and
indicates the p-value (∗∗∗ : p < 0.01, ∗∗ : 0.01 ≤ p < 0.05, ∗ : 0.05 ≤ p < 0.1). Column “α”
reports standard errors in parentheses. Calculations based on unadjusted, unscaled PIT
data.
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B.5 Portfolio composition
Table B.8 compares the portfolio composition in the NIDS data to
the national accounts. One salient feature in this comparison is the
understatement if financial assets relative to the non-financial assets in the
survey. Pension and non-pension financial assets each constitute a third of
total assets in the national accounts, but only 10 percent of total assets in
the NIDS. While the composition of liabilities matches the national accounts
more closely, the debt-asset ratio shows that liabilities are understated to an
even greater extent than assets, leading to an overstatement of net wealth.
This finding is largely robust to the removal of potential outliers with regard
to wealth (as identified in Appendix B.7).
Table 3.5 reports the wealth distribution by asset class. It shows that the
distribution of total assets is very similar to the distribution of net wealth,
which justifies the comparison between wealth in the NIDS and assets in the
PIT.
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Pension/life assets 11 16 47 36
Non-pension financial assets 9 13 5 32
Real estate assets 76 67 45 26
Other non-financial assets 4 4 2 6
Total assets 100 100 100 100
Mortgage debt 52 76 52 57
Other debt 48 24 48 43
Total liabilities 100 100 100 100
Liabilities/assets (%) 11 6 7 20
Wealth/income (%) 538 426 774 231
Note: Portfolio composition, NIDS, 2010, in percent of total assets (liabilities). “Trimmed
sample” excludes outliers (see Appendix B.3). “Pension adjusted sample” includes
adjustment for pensions (see Appendix B.6). Calculations based on weighted sample
using adult-level data and post-stratified weights, using complete observations only (i.e.
individuals without missing values on the level of any asset class: n = 4, 917 in full sample;
n = 4, 275 in trimmed sample).
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B.6 Pensions in the NIDS
Despite the fact that half of private- and public-sector employees are covered
by occupational pension schemes (National Treasury, 2012), only five percent
of adults reported owning a pension or retirement annuity in the NIDS, and
only a third of these were able or willing to provide a quantification. I attempt
to correct for this by imputing pension assets for all employed individuals
with zero- or non-responses regarding the current value of these assets.
Under the assumption of consumer price inflation (pip) of 6%, wage
inflation (piw) of 8% (including promotional effects), nominal investment
returns (r) of 10%, a constant contribution rate of 15% of the annual labour
market income (y) and a starting age of 25 years, we can estimate the current
value of a person’s pension from his or her age and current contributions
(ccurr = 0.15×y). Since pension funds allow people to withdraw their pension
assets when switching between jobs, I also apply a 50% withdrawal discount
(w) on the estimated assets in pension funds.4
I first estimate the initial pension and retirement fund contribution
at age 25 (cini) per Equation B.3, and then calculate the current value of
previous contributions per Equation B.4, where n denotes the number of





passets = cini × (1 + r)
n − (1 + piw)n
(r − piw) × (1− w) (B.4)
This imputation raises the share of pension assets from just above 10 to
to just below 50 percent of assets – considerably higher than in the national
accounts (see Table B.8). Since withdrawal rates are likely higher for low-
income people (who switch jobs more often and have greater need to use
their pensions to support consumption between jobs), this estimation likely
understates true inequality (National Treasury, 2012).
4The author acknowledges the advice of Davy Corobulo and Natalie Van Zyl with
regards to realistic assumptions on retirement saving dynamics in South Africa.
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B.7 Wealth, race and gender
Tables B.9 and B.10 contain detailed results for the wealth distribution
by racial group and gender. With regards to race, Table B.9 shows that
between-group inequality remains very high, but also shows that within-
group inequality of the African group exceeds that for the overall population,
being much higher than the level of inequality within any other racial group.
With regards to gender, Table B.10 shows little difference in the mean and
median wealth of men and women.
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Table B.9: Wealth and race
African Coloured Indian White
Median wealth (’000 R) 0 0 10 200
Average wealth (’000 R) 32 68 994 1 810
Top 10% wealth share (%) 98 84 84 72
Middle 40% (%) 6 17 16 27
Bottom 50% (%) -4 -1 0 1
Total (%) 100 100 100 100
Observations 15 321 2 547 218 585
Note: Wealth by racial group, NIDS, 2010. Calculations based on weighted sample using
adult-level data and post-stratified weights.
Table B.10: Wealth and gender
NIDS PIT (unscaled)
Male Female Male Female
Median wealth (’000 R) 0 0 0 3
Average wealth (’000 R) 105 103 18 15
Top 10% wealth share (%) 95 94 73 60
Middle 40% (%) 7 7 28 41
Bottom 50% (%) -2 -1 -1 -1
Total (%) 100 100 100 100
Observations 8 004 10 667 668 369 493 397
Note: Wealth by gender, NIDS and PIT, 2010. NIDS calculations based on weighted
sample using adult-level data and post-stratified weights. PIT calculations based on
total investment incomes, with adjustments for tax-exempt interest income and pensions
(unscaled, relative to the tax-filing sub-population).
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Wealth in the PIT
This appendix contains additional information on the data in the second
wave of the Personal Income Tax (PIT) assessment sample of 2011 (section
C.1), on the imputation of pension assets (section C.2) and on the results
before scaling to non-filers (section C.3). It also provides an overview of the
assessment sample of 2014, which was made available by SARS but which
was not analysed in the third chapter of this thesis (section C.4).
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C.1 PIT Data and Sample
C.1.1 PIT assessment sample
The South African Revenue Services gave us access to a 20 percent sample
of the 2011 income tax assessment. Table C.1 provides an overview over
the series provided in the assessment sample, and the derivations of the
variables used in this chapter. Table C.2 then provides an overview over the
observations in the 20 percent sample.
C.1.2 PIT filing thresholds
Whether or not someone is included in the PIT database depends on their
liability to file income taxes. In 2011, South African residents were liable to
file personal income taxes if their incomes exceeded the following thresholds
(SARS, 2011):
– income from a single employer exceeds R120,000 for the year, and/or
– income from more than one employer exceeds R60,000, and/or
– local interest income in excess of R22,300 for taxpayers below the age
of 65 or R32,000 for taxpayers aged 65 and older and/or
– foreign interest or dividend income in excess of R3,700, and/or
– income from own business, irrespective of the amount.
According to the NIDS, the labour income threshold should be exceeded
by only 3-7 percent of employees, while the investment income threshold
should be exceeded by about one third of recipients of investment incomes. In
reality, about 95 percent of tax filers (16 percent of the population) declared
incomes from employment in the PIT, while only 7 percent (1 percent of the
population) declared incomes from investments.
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Table C.1: PIT – Data Overview
Item Code Notes
Local interest 4201 Local interest earned†
+ Local capital gains 4250
Excludes the basic exemption for capital
gains (exclusion rate in 2010-11: 75%)
− Local capital losses 4251
+ Other gains 42*
Local dividends†; rental profits/losses;
income from building societies; income
from fixed period shares and deposits;
royalties; foreign investment income
(interest, dividends, capital gains/losses);
gambling gains/losses





+ Business profits 01-34* Profits/losses from unincorporated
businesses or trades
− Business losses 01-34*
= Business income
+ Normal income 36
Local and foreign labour and pension
income
+ Fringe benefits 38
+ Lump sum income 39
Local and foreign lump-sump
income, including special remuneration
and pension/ provident fund lump-sums
= Labour income‡
= Gross income All incomes received by the individual
− Deductions 40
E.g., Taxes paid under pay-as-you-earn;
pension, provident or medical fund
contributions
− Exemptions The exempted portion of interest income,
all local dividends
= Taxable income
Taxable income used to determine the
normal tax due (before any rebates and
tax credits)
Note: Overview over the data in the PIT assessment sample. ∗Asterisks refer to the
subset of items under the respective SARS Code that not mentioned separately in the
table. † Local interest below the threshold of R22,300 and local dividend income in its
entirety is exempt from the PIT, and the accuracy of exempt incomes is not verified in
the tax inspection process. ‡Employment income derived from taxable normal and lump
sum income (only taxable portion of normal and lump sum income provided by SARS).
146
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
C.1. PIT DATA AND SAMPLE
Table C.2: PIT – Sample Overview
Number Notes
Total population 49 991 300
Of which aged 15+ 34 487 100
Submitted tax records 5 876 889
Implausible/null values 956
Implausible or null values excluded by
SARS
Remaining tax records 5 875 933
Of which high-earners 602
“High earners” with taxable incomes >





Assessment sample as made available by
SARS to the author
Ages 15+ only 1 173 469
20% sample of high-
earners
120
Summary statistics on all high-earners
made available by SARS (mean, standard
deviation, minimum, maximum, 25th,
50th and 75th percentiles)
Note: Overview over the observations in the PIT assessment sample. Population totals
from StatsSA mid-year population estimates.
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C.2 Pensions in the PIT
The PIT provides no information on investment incomes on pension assets.
However, the PIT contains data on current contributions to pension or
retirement annuity funds, which allow us to estimate the current value of
pension assets in analogy to the procedure described for the NIDS (see
Appendix B.6). The main difference is that we can read current contributions
directly from the data (as opposed to estimating it at 15% of current
earnings), and that we can distinguish contributions to pension funds and
from contributions to retirement annuity funds. Since assets in the latter
cannot be withdrawn before retirement, I apply the 50% discount to the
assets in pension funds only.
Since the PIT works records investment incomes rather than the
underlying assets, the annual investment income on pension assets needs
to be estimated per Equation C.1:
pincome = passets × r (C.1)
I set the investment income from pension assets to zero for people below
25, and to missing for people above 65.1 When calculating distributional
statistics for pension assets (or total investment income including pension
assets), I then work on the population below 65 years only.2
When estimating investment incomes on pension assets with this
approach, they constitute almost 80 percent of total investment incomes. Yet,
the imputation seems to still understate true pension wealth significantly:
imputed pension wealth in the PIT amounts to only 21 percent of the “total
assets of private self-administered pension and provident funds”.
1Ideally, we would set only retirees to missing, while keeping zero pension wealth
for people above 65, who do not receive a pension and do not contribute to pension
or retirement annuity funds. However, the current SARS dataset does not distinguish
between labour and pension incomes under employment income.
2To scale investment incomes to the total population, I use a censoring value of R1,950,
at which I arrive by applying the median ratio of pension investment incomes to labor
incomes to the filing threshold to labor incomes.
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As in the case of the NIDS, our estimates likely understate the
true inequality of pension wealth significantly (since withdrawal rates and
interruptions to contribution times are likely higher for low-income people).
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C.3 PIT Unscaled results
Table C.3 and Figure C.1 provide results on the wealth distribution within
the tax-filing sub-population (prior to scaling), and show the importance
of the adjustments made to the measure of wealth. The imputation of
interest incomes below the filing threshold via a bottom-censored log-normal
distribution is the most important adjustment in the unscaled sample. In the
scaled sample, the imputation of interest incomes below the filing threshold
has a much smaller impact.
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Table C.3: PIT – In-sample (unscaled) distribution
Income source Share 6= 0 Top 10% Top 1% Gini
Employment 91 38 10 0.52
Local interest 3 100 77 0.99
Other investment 5 105 82 1.09
Total investment 7 104 67 1.05
Pensions† 52 62 22 0.79
Local interest, adjusted for
tax-exempt omissions∗ 100 36 12 0.46
Total investment, adjusted
for tax-exempt interest∗ 100 50 24 0.59
Total investment, adjusted
for tax-exempt interest &
pensions‡
100 47 19 0.59
Note: Quantile shares, PIT, 2010. Results relative to the tax-filing population (not scaled
to non-filers). Second column contains share of non-zero observations. ∗Adjustment
for omissions of tax-exempt interest income described in Section 3.3.3. †Adjustment for
investment income on pension assets described in Appendix C.2; Distributional metrics for
the population < 65 years only. ‡Distributional metrics for the total population (results for
the population < 65 years only marginally lower). Note that in the presence of individuals
with negative investment incomes, the Gini coefficient is no longer bounded to one (see
also OECD, 2015).
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Figure C.1: PIT – In-sample (unscaled) distribution
Note: Income distribution, PIT, 2010. Unscaled results. Left panel: Kernel density curves
of logged incomes; right panel: Lorenz curves.
152
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
C.4. PIT 2014: MAIN RESULTS
C.4 PIT 2014: Main results
SARS also provided us with a 20 percent sample of the 2014 tax assessment
for 2013-2014 tax year. Table C.4 summarizes the results for the within-
sample distribution. It suggests that inequality is slightly lower than in the
2010-2011 tax year, although this is likely due to higher filing rates.
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Table C.4: PIT – 2010-2011 vs 2013-2014
Income source Share 6= 0 Top 10% Top 1% Gini
2011
Employment 91 38 10 0.52
Local interest 3 100 77 0.99
Other investment 5 105 82 1.09
Total investment 7 104 68 1.05
2014
Employment 94 36 10 0.49
Local interest 4 100 78 0.99
Other investment 7 102 81 1.02
Total investment 9 102 71 1.01
Note: Quantile shares, PIT, 2010 and 2013. Results relative to the tax-filing population
(not scaled to non-filers). Second column contains share of non-zero observations. Note
that in the presence of individuals with negative investment incomes, the Gini coefficient
is no longer bounded to one (see also OECD, 2015).
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